The Lottery as a Democratic Institution by Delannoi, Gil et al.
THE LOTTERY AS A
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION
GIL DELANNOI
OLIVER DOWLEN
PETER STONE
University of Dublin
Trinity College
S
tu
d
ie
s 
In
 P
u
b
li
c 
P
o
li
cy
 2
8
In partnershIp wIth
scIences po parIs
 
THE LOTTERY AS A DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION
3
The LoTTery as a DemocraTic insTiTuTion
Gil Delannoi
Sciences Po Paris
98 Rue De L’Université
75007 Paris, France
+33-1-45-49-50-64
gil.delannoi@sciences-po.fr
oliver Dowlen
School of Politics and International Relations
Queen Mary, University of London
Mile End Road
London E1 4NS, United Kingdom
e.o.dowlen@qmul.ac.uk
Peter stone
Political Science Department
3 College Green
Trinity College
Dublin 2, Ireland
+353-1-896-2491
pstone@tcd.ie
THE LOTTERY AS A DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION
4
contents
The Lottery as a Democratic Institution ...................................................................................... 3
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 5
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 7
Summary of Findings .................................................................................................................... 9
Attendees ...................................................................................................................................... 10
Part 1: What Can Lotteries Contribute to Politics? ................................................................... 12
Part 2: How Can Lotteries Best Be Incorporated into Modern Democratic Institutions? ..... 22
Part 3: What Questions Regarding Lotteries Remain for Future Research? .......................... 31
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 41
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... 46
Appendix 1: Programme for
“The Lottery as a Democratic Institution: A Workshop” ......................................................... 47
Appendix 2: Summary of Proceedings for
“The Lottery as a Democratic Institution: A Workshop” ......................................................... 48
Appendix 3: Speaker Biographies .............................................................................................. 61
ConTenTS
THE LOTTERY AS A DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION
5
inTroDucTion
on october 11-12, 2012, “The Lottery as a Democratic Theory” was held at Trinity College 
Dublin. This workshop brought together an interdisciplinary research team from across 
Europe to consider the role of lotteries in a vibrant and well-functioning modern democratic 
polity. In particular, the workshop considered how the careful use of random selection in 
politics might contribute to the revitalization of democracy in the 21st century. The event 
was jointly organised by Gil Delannoi (Sciences Po), oliver Dowlen (QMUL) and Peter 
Stone (Trinity College Dublin) in collaboration with The Policy Institute (http://www.tcd.
ie/policy-institute/events/Lottery_workshop_oct12.php).
The large and growing problems facing modern democracies have led many to reconsider 
the idea of selecting some political officials by lot. The randomly-selected jury remains 
widely regarded as a model of bringing ordinary people together to make vital public 
decisions. As a result, there are now many proposals to use the lottery as a democratic 
institution more expansively. This is increasingly seen as a way to restore life to 
dysfunctional democracies in the wake of recent crises, from the “War on Terror” to the 
banking crisis.
But while the idea of selecting political officials by lot is receiving more and more 
attention, it still strikes many people as unrealistic and utopian. This is in part a reflection 
of the fact that the ideal of democracy has been closely associated with elections for 
the past two centuries. Any attempt to move away from voting by the citizenry—either 
for representatives or for policies via referenda—is viewed as anti-democratic. This 
association overlooks the close association between democracy and random selection that 
prevailed up until the 18th century.1 Indeed, Aristotle famously proposed that elections 
were inherently aristocratic, while selection by lot was the democratic way of filling public 
offices. Nevertheless, it is understandable that people would be skittish about large-scale 
changes to their political institutions, particularly when they have little direct experience 
with lotteries in politics.
The workshop sought to address these concerns. It did so in two ways. First, it brought 
together both proponents of random selection and political scientists broadly concerned 
with democratic institutions. Second, it invited both of these groups to examine what is 
1 Manin (1997) carefully examines the history of democracy, its early association with random 
selection, and its later association with representation and elections.
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currently known about lotteries and what questions still remain to be investigated. To 
orient these discussions, the workshop asked the following three questions:
1) What can lotteries contribute to politics?
2) How can lotteries best be incorporated into modern democratic institutions?
3) What questions regarding lotteries remain for future research?
The organizers of the workshop circulated a draft document to the participants which 
proposed answers to these three questions. This draft document was then revised in light 
of the discussion at the workshop, as well as subsequent feedback. This report is the result.2
2 The authors would like to stress the report’s status as a discussion document, designed to stimulate 
the exploration of the ideas expressed in the seminar series which generated it. It does not represent 
any common or defined position taken by the authors as a group
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backGrounD
There is a growing interest among both academics and ordinary citizens in random selection 
as a means of allocating social goods and assigning public responsibilities. Economists, 
legal scholars, political scientists, philosophers, and sociologists have investigated the 
many historical uses to which lotteries have been put. They have also examined the 
arguments for and against the use of lotteries, as well as the specific circumstances under 
which lottery use may be advisable.3 
This growing interest in lotteries has generated an international working group for 
scholars and non-scholars with an interest in random selection. This group calls itself the 
Kleroterians, after the device employed by the Athenians to select their juries. Founded by 
economist Conall Boyle, this group brings together proponents of lottery use from Australia, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and other countries in a truly international and interdisciplinary network. The 
group currently maintains a blog, entitled Equality by Lot (http://equalitybylot.wordpress.
com/), as well as a Facebook page and a Google Group. It has also brought members together 
in a variety of settings. The first two of these organized activities were a session at the 
2008 Manchester Workshops in Political Theory and a conference entitled “Selection by 
Lottery: Theory and Practice,” held at Sciences Po, Paris, on November 27, 2008.
In 2011, Gil Delannoi, oliver Dowlen, and Peter Stone began organizing a series of 
workshops as part of an ongoing Research Program on Sortition. (The term “sortition” 
refers to the practice of selection by lot.) The goal of these workshops was to advance the 
study of random selection in politics, understand its advantages and disadvantages, and 
explore the contribution it can make to politics today. It sought to bring political theory to 
bear on the problem of institutional design, a task attempted all-too-rarely in the academic 
world today (cf. Waldron 2013). The first of these workshops was held at Sciences Po, 
Paris, on october 6-7, 2011, under the title “Sortition and Direct Democracy.” The second 
session, entitled “Sortition and the State,” took place on November 18-19, 2011, also at 
Sciences Po. The third session was devoted to Bernard Manin’s classic work The Principles 
of Representative Government (1997). It was held at Sciences Po on May 24-25, 2012.
3 Important books in this literature include Elster (1989), Carson and Martin (1999), Duxbury (1999), 
Goodwin (2005), Burnheim (2006), Dowlen (2008), and Stone (2011). Many of the central papers on the 
topic of lotteries have been collected in Stone, ed. (2011).
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The october 11-12, 2012 Dublin workshop was the fourth in this ongoing series. Stone, 
as the local organizer of the event, took responsibility for the workshop’s theme. He was 
particularly anxious to expand the circle of people involved in the dialogue surrounding 
random selection in politics. This had been one of the organizers’ goals throughout the 
series of workshops; at each event, a point was made to invite both established Kleroterians 
as well as fresh faces to take part. Stone wished to take this process a step further. He did 
this by inviting political scientists broadly concerned with participatory and deliberative 
democracy but without specific interest in lotteries. He invited these newcomers to come 
together with Kleroterians and other established lottery advocates in a dialogue on the 
role of lotteries in the democracy process.
To this end, Delannoi, Dowlen, and Stone produced a draft document for discussion by 
the workshop participants. (The draft report can be found at http://www.tcd.ie/policy-
institute/assets/pdf/Lottery_Report_oct12.pdf.) The document addressed three questions 
regarding the lottery as a democratic institution. First, what can random selection 
contribute to politics? Second, how can random selection best be incorporated into 
modern democratic institutions? Third, what research questions on lotteries still need to 
be addressed? The document was presented at the workshop, and the presentations, along 
with the discussions that followed, were recorded by Dowlen. The conversation generated 
by this draft document at the workshop formed the basis for the revision and expansion of 
the document into the present report.
In addition, Stone presented drafts of this report at the Séminaire de Recherche, Département 
de Science Politique et Relations Internationals, University of Geneva, March 11, 2013; and 
at the Political Science Department Writing Workshop, Trinity College Dublin, April 2, 
2013. Comments and suggestions received at these two events were also incorporated into 
the final version of this report.
Delannoi, Dowlen, and Stone plan to continue organizing additional sessions of the 
Research Program on Sortition. A session is scheduled to be held at QMUL on october 
10-11, 2013. Hopefully, this report will contribute to the ongoing dialogue generated by 
the Research Program, and spark further interest in the potential contribution lotteries 
can make to democracy.
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summary of finDinGs
Proponents of random selection in politics have identified at least eight potential 
contributions that the practice can make to the political process. These are: descriptive 
representation, prevention of corruption and/or domination, mitigation of elite-level 
conflict, control of political outliers, distributive justice, participation, rotation, and 
psychological benefits. We argue that random selection makes its strongest contribution 
when it selects citizens to function as impartial guardians of the political system. This 
means selecting citizens at random, not to make policy or enact laws, but to protect the 
integrity of the political process—by making and enforcing legislative ethics standards, 
for example. Random selection’s strongest contribution is to the prevention of corruption 
and/or domination; the fact that it enables descriptive representation, while undeniably 
true, is less important to politics.
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ParT 1: WhaT can LoTTeries conTribuTe To PoLiTics?
Lotteries have been used to make an incredibly wide variety of decisions. They have, for 
example, been used to decide who gets admitted to a desirable school, who gets drafted, 
and which person stranded in a lifeboat gets eaten or thrown overboard. They have 
been used to admit people to jury duty, military service, performances of the Mormon 
Tabernacle Choir, and Michael Jackson’s funeral. They have been used to determine the 
order of candidate names on ballots, as well as the order of author names on published 
articles. (For an extensive list of real or hypothetical lottery uses, with documentation, see 
Stone 2011, section 1.2). one of the most common and consistent uses to which lotteries 
have been put is the assignment of public responsibilities. Random selection has been 
incorporated into a wide variety of schemes to fill public offices, and an even wider variety 
of schemes have been proposed in recent years. In this report, we will deal mainly with 
the use of lotteries for this specific purpose. We will refer to this use of lotteries in this 
report as sortition.4 We focus upon the problem of identifying and defending the proper 
use of sortition in the contemporary world.
Sortition has been widely used in the past by small city-states, notably in ancient Greece 
and Renaissance-era Italy. But it has been effectively eclipsed by electoral democracy in 
the modern world, despite the continued survival of the jury in the Anglo-American world. 
Nevertheless, the many deficiencies of contemporary democracy have led to a growing 
revival of interest in sortition over the past few decades. Vergne (2010) catalogues this 
revival, demonstrating a clear increase in academic studies devoted to random selection 
in politics since the 1950s. Moreover, each year seems to generate new theoretical and 
empirical findings on the topic of sortition. The blog Equality by Lot offers a review at the 
end of each year of the latest work on the topic; its latest review can be found at http://
equalitybylot.wordpress.com/2012/12/29/2012-review-sortition-related-events/.
The idea of sortition has a certain intuitive appeal. one politician, when confronted with 
the idea of selecting Congress by lot, for example, quipped, “The idea of a lottery is at first 
4 The term “sortition” has historically had a wider meaning than this. The Shorter oxford English 
Dictionary defines “sortition” as “The casting or drawing of lots; selection, choice, or determination 
by lot.” There is disagreement among current proponents of lottery use as to how the term ought to be 
used today. Stone (the main author of parts I and III) favours a refined definition of the term as denoting 
the selection of citizens for public office. Dowlen (the main author of part II), on the other hand, 
favours maintaining the traditional use of the term as referring to the mechanism or act of drawing of 
lots itself. In most cases this has little effect on the meaning of the text as the report’s focus is on the 
selection of citizens for office, but the reader should be aware of this distinction.
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thought absurd, and at second thought obvious” (Callenbach and Phillips 2008, p. 75).5 But 
this intuitive appeal has not yet led to a single unified understanding as to when and why 
sortition makes sense. Rather, it has led to a diversity of arguments that do not necessarily 
fit together well. A careful scrutiny of this diversity will demonstrate the extent to which 
proponents of sortition agree, as well as identify points of disagreement that have yet 
to be resolved. Both of these results will advance the study of sortition; moreover, the 
identification of points of disagreement will provide a clear focus for future research.
This report will scrutinize the existing state of play in the study of sortition. It will 
begin by cataloguing the major benefits that sortition, in the eyes of its admirers, can 
bring to politics. It will not, at this stage, examine the plausibility of those benefits, or 
the conditions under which those benefits can be realized. It will simply provide a list 
of the reasons sortition proponents have put forth in defence of the practice. It will then 
inquire whether there is any unity underlying these reasons, whether there is anything 
about lottery use that explains why sortition should prove capable of providing all of these 
advantages. It will ask, in other words, whether there is, or could be, such a thing as a 
general theory of lottery use. The performance of these tasks will enable us to answer the 
question, what can lotteries contribute to politics.
Answering this question is the goal of this section of our report. The second section will 
then apply the answer generated in this section to the problem of identifying the best 
ways to bring sortition to bear in contemporary politics. In other words, it will address the 
question, how can lotteries best be incorporated into modern democratic institutions. The 
final section will ask what questions regarding sortition still remain for future research. 
It will accomplish this by reconsidering the list of benefits generated by sortition. It will 
tentatively evaluate this list. This requires asking two further questions: 1) how strong a 
connection can be established between sortition and each benefit, and 2) is each benefit 
really a benefit. The third section can offer no firm answers to these two questions; rather, 
it will offer some suggestions that will hopefully provide a good starting point for future, 
more detailed inquiries into these topics.
We begin, then, by considering the various virtues attributed to sortition. Proponents 
of sortition evoke at least eight distinct contributions that lottery use can make to the 
political process. Some of these contributions receive more attention than others in the 
5 When we presented the draft report at a seminar at the University of Geneva, one audience member 
commented that sortition was “one of the sexiest ideas in political theory” today. We concur.
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literature, with others receiving attention sporadically or hardly at all. Many of these 
contributions result in the improvement of the quality of political decision-making; some, 
however, constitute “side benefits” to the political process not directly related to decision-
making proper. Not everyone agrees that sortition can generate all of these contributions. 
Moreover, not everyone agrees that all of these contributions constitute genuine benefits. 
Put another way, sortition may or may not generate all of these effects, and these effects 
may or may not all be good. We list these contributions here in roughly descending order 
of the amount of attention they receive in the literature surrounding sortition:
a) Descriptive representation. Sortition ensures that any property appearing in the general 
population will also appear in roughly the same proportions on a randomly-selected 
decision-making body. This property of sortition is very robust so long as two conditions 
hold. First, the decision-making body must have a significant number of members (ideally, 
several hundred). obviously, descriptive representation is a meaningless standard to 
apply to an office occupied by only a single individual; one president cannot, in any 
meaningful sense, be said to represent descriptively the entire country. But this is not a 
serious objection to sortition; there are no examples in the historical record of lotteries 
being used to select single officeholders, and virtually no live proposals today to attempt 
this.6 Still, sortition has been employed to select small decision-making bodies that are 
minimally capable of ensuring descriptive representation; it was used, for example, 
to select various 10-member administrative boards in classical Athens, and it is used 
to select 12-member juries in the Anglo-American world today. Such uses of sortition 
cannot robustly be justified in terms of descriptive representation. Second, random 
selection must proceed from a pool consisting of the entire population it is supposed to 
represent descriptively. Adding additional selection criteria—by requiring citizens to 
volunteer for duty, for example, or even by allowing citizens to opt out of the selection 
process—will alter the population to be represented. Efforts to ensure that officeholders 
possess motivation, experience, ability, or any other criteria not possessed by the entire 
population threaten to work against the ideal of descriptive representation.
b) Prevention of corruption and/or domination: The democratic process can be severely 
undermined when officeholders use their offices to benefit themselves. Sortition 
hampers this process by ensuring that those anxious to obtain office for venal purposes 
6 Lotteries have, however, been incorporated into voting schemes to select single officeholders—
the Doge of Venice, for example. They have also been employed to fill largely ceremonial offices. In 
democratic Athens, a single member of the Athenian boule (council) was randomly selected every day 
to serve as “president” of Athens.
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cannot obtain it more reliably than anyone else. (obviously, sortition can do nothing 
if the majority of the population desires office for such venal purposes, although other 
institutions can be adopted alongside sortition to address the problem.) More seriously, 
the process can be undermined when outside interests suborn officeholders so as to 
make the latter advance the former’s agenda at the expense of the general interest. 
This can happen either because the special interests influence the selection process 
(ensuring that only those favouring the special interest cause obtain office), or because 
they influence those selected according to other criteria (through bribes and/or threats). 
Sortition obviously prevents special interests from influencing the selection process; 
it can also prevent bribes and threats provided that the random selection process is 
suitably insulated.7 By preventing objectionable reasons from influencing the selection 
process, random selection—a process which excludes reasons from decision-making, 
can ironically enable more reasoned behaviour on the part of public officials, behaviour 
untainted by special interests. (yann-Allard Tremblay stressed this last point during 
the workshop.)8 This may also have the more general effect of limiting the effects of 
economic power upon political power, a point made by Ètienne Chouard during the 
workshop. Domination, according to Michael Walzer, occurs when inequality in one 
sphere of life inappropriately leads to inequality in another sphere (Walzer 1983). 
Sortition may help limit economic domination of this sort.
c) Mitigation of elite-level conflict: Political competition, like economic competition, is 
desirable only when it serves the interest of the broader public. Market competition 
between firms can do this by producing lower prices, higher quality, etc. But market 
competition founders if firms either form cartels to restrain competition, or engage in 
destructive forms of competition (e.g., blowing up rival factories). Similarly, political 
competition between elites can benefit the public when educated, informed, and 
motivated politicians compete for public support by offering socially desirable policies. 
But this competition founders when elites either compete too little (by establishing 
7 This requires, for example, that the selected officials assume office immediately, and that either they 
are sequestered or access to them is suitably controlled or monitored. If the public enjoys full public 
access to randomly-selected officials, as they do with many public officials, then additional forms of 
protection against corruption will of course be required.
8 Those who remain sceptical of this point should take care not to run afoul of the fallacy of 
composition. Reason may fail to obtain in one stage of the political process without preventing the 
entire process from being reasoned. Indeed, the former might even be a prerequisite for the latter.
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“political cartels”) or too much (at the limit, by engaging in civil war).9 The former effect 
can be curtailed through sortition by preventing elites from controlling the selection 
process. This is the “protection against domination” effect described previously. The 
latter effect is similarly curtailed through sortition; because no faction of the elite can 
stack randomly-selected bodies with its supporters, no elites need fear such a faction 
taking control of the entire political system. (one could also dub this the mitigation 
of partisanship.) This motivation was surely present in the selection process used in 
Renaissance-era Venice to select its head of state, the doge. The selection process was 
incredibly complex, involving multiple levels of election and sortition. Whatever the 
process’s defects, it survived for five hundred years (Finlay 1980).
d) Control of political outliers: Small groups with outlier preferences may be highly 
motivated to suborn the political process. They may thus gain a measure of political 
influence totally disproportionate to their size. Sortition can mitigate this by ensuring 
that such outlier groups cannot obtain vastly oversized representation; at the limit, 
when perfect descriptive representation is attained, no such group can obtain political 
office in numbers larger than its presence in the general population. Deviations from 
proportionality will of course weaken this effect; if sortition is used to select only among 
volunteers, for example, an outlier group might become radically overrepresented.10 
And sortition can only mitigate the effects of outlier preferences; if a majority or a large 
minority has despicable preferences, sortition can do little to mitigate this fact. (But 
then again, no democratic process can do much better.)
e) Distributive justice. The citizens of classical Athens regarded public office as a good, 
one to which all citizens had equal claims (Mulgan 1984). Most modern citizens are 
9 Shapiro sees this as the essential insight of Joseph Schumpeter (2010). “The underlying logic,” 
Shapiro writes, “of his [Schumpeter’s] argument is disarmingly simple. It reduces to a double claim: 
(1) that structured competition for power is preferable both to Hobbesian anarchy and to the power 
monopoly that Hobbes saw as the logical response to it, and (2) that the choices among anarchy, 
monopoly, and competition are the only meaningful possibilities” (Shapiro 2003, p. 55).
10 This may, of course, be regarded as a strength. John Burnheim, in his book Is Democracy Possible? 
(2006), defends sortition from a pool of volunteers as a way of ensuring that those who care the most 
about issues are the ones who make decisions regarding those issues. This might have the effects 
of increasing stability and ensuring that decision-makers are knowledgeable. But the mere fact that 
volunteers want something different from what the public as a whole wants poses a challenge to 
democratic theory, even if volunteers have no venal motivations (cf. Walzer 1970). And the beneficial 
effects are far from certain. If volunteers are sharply divided on an issue, then empowering them 
could decrease stability. And those who care the most about an issue may be motivated to become 
knowledgeable about the subject, but they also may not (e.g., creationists).
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not so covetous of officeholding; witness the lengths to which people will go to avoid 
jury duty. But if public office were, not a valued social benefit, but a genuine social 
burden, then one might make the argument that the avoidance of public office is a good 
to which all citizens have equal claims.11 Either way, a lottery is a fair way to distribute 
benefits (burdens) among those who have equal claims to them (avoiding them) (Stone 
2007; Stone 2011, part II). But neither of these positions is widely held today; most 
citizens of modern democracy tend to think of political equality as an equal right to 
select political officials, as well as an equal right to pursue office, but not an equal right 
to office itself (Manin 1997). This understanding fits well with the idea of a society-wide 
division of labour, which allows some to specialize in politics while leaving others free 
to pursue other goals (Constant 1988). Most modern proponents of sortition share this 
view. While they recognize the limits of making politics a vocation (not to mention its 
dangers—those most motivated to obtain political expertise are often those with the 
most to gain by corrupting the political process), and tout the advantages of a certain 
amount of political amateurism, few defend the idea of political office as a good in itself.12 
f) Participation. While few proponents of sortition explicitly argue that political office 
should be regarded as a good, many share the widespread concern with declining 
political participation and citizen apathy. They believe it is important both for 
political systems to provide genuine opportunities for participation and to ensure 
that such participation takes place. (This is sometimes described as the problem of 
making the system “inclusive.”) Rarely, however, do they explain why political 
systems should do this, although many participatory democrats endorse John Stuart 
Mill’s case for the educative effects of participation (Bachrach 1967; Pateman 1970). 
Again, the counterargument is that politics is a profession, like any other, and best 
left to the experts. There is therefore no reason to fret if many refuse to get involved 
with politics, any more than if many took no interest in particle physics or chemical 
engineering or patent law. The political process may work better if politics is not left to 
the professionals, but this fact is properly captured by the other advantages to sortition 
11 on the avoidance of a burden as a benefit, see Sher (1980).
12 Equality and impartiality are sometimes expressed as separate values advanced by a lottery. 
But it is difficult to see how both values could be specified in a manner that leaves them distinct. 
Impartiality, on most accounts, involves keeping irrelevant factors out of the decision-making process. 
(This is what is normally meant by the saying, “Justice is blind.”) But if equality is a democratic 
value, in the sense that all citizens are equally entitled to hold office, then all distinctions between 
citizens are irrelevant for purposes of filling those offices. Conversely, if there exist legitimate reasons 
for distinguishing between citizens in assigning public responsibilities, then citizens should receive 
unequal but impartial access to those responsibilities.
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listed above. More important for the purposes of the argument here is that participation 
is, in a very real sense, zero-sum. Given a fixed number of offices, only a certain number 
of citizens can obtain the participatory benefits of office-holding, no matter what the 
selection method used. Sortition may be said to enable participation by allowing 
different, as opposed to more, people to participate—specifically, people traditionally 
excluded from the political process due to poverty, race, etc. Also, sortition may be 
used in conjunction with an expansion in the number of offices, enabling a greater total 
quantity of participation.
g) Rotation. Proponents of sortition also frequently tout the fact that the practice ensures 
rotation of political office (e.g., Goodwin 2005, ch. 6). Rotation is sometimes conflated 
with participation, but this is a mistake. Rotation simply means that there is turnover 
in office, that the people in power today are not same as the people in power tomorrow. 
It reflects the Aristotelian ideal of ruling and being ruled in turn. It is unclear how 
distinct is the contribution to politics made by rotation. If rotation is desirable, for 
example, because it lets more people participate in politics; or because the it allows the 
benefit/burdens of political office to be shared widely amongst the citizenry; or because 
it prevents of domination of politics by elite groups; then rotation can likely be reduced 
to one or more of the other advantages catalogued here.
h) Psychological benefits. It is transparent that officeholders selected by lot are not 
selected on the basis of any personal quality, positive or negative, they might possess. 
Therefore, it is difficult for those who win office to feel any special entitlement to 
office,13 or for those who lose office to feel any special deference to those who win. It 
is an open question how strong this effect really is, although its existence seems very 
likely.14 This effect does, however, seem parasitic on the others described here. other 
psychological effects are possible, a point made by Hubertus Buchstein during the 
workshop. Participation via sortition may, for example, promote a sense of reciprocity, 
as well as personal autonomy and confidence. But care must be taken here; while some 
of these effects may be tied specifically to sortition, others will likely follow from any 
procedure that brings traditionally marginalized citizens into the political process.
13 But not impossible, if the lottery is interpreted as expressing the will of some higher power, such 
as God or fate. To see the lottery this way, however, is to see it as not being a real lottery at all. See 
Stone (2010a).
14 Kleroterian Jan-Willem Burgers has stressed the importance of this sortition-related benefit in past 
work. See in particular Burgers (2011). He has, however, since distanced himself from this position.
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We regard this list of proposed benefits generated by sortition as fairly comprehensive. 
There may be a case to be made for reclassifying these benefits, perhaps lumping two 
of them together or splitting one of them into two sub-benefits. There may be a case for 
eliminating one or more of these benefits as purely derivative from the others. But this 
list exhausts the current reasons for favouring sortition in the contemporary debates 
surrounding the topic.15 
Scholars concerned with sortition thus recognize a number of contributions that the 
practice can make to the assignment of public or political responsibilities. They disagree, 
however, whether these contributions can all be explained by a general theory of lottery 
use.16 There are two positions on this subject, which can be described as the “monist” 
and “pluralist” positions (Burgers 2013, ch. 3). Both monists and pluralists agree that 
decision-making by lottery will, depending upon the nature of the decision in question, 
offer numerous advantages and disadvantages. But monists argue that lotteries possess 
a single property that accounts for all of these advantages and disadvantages, and that 
this property accounts for all of these advantages and disadvantages in roughly the same 
way. They accordingly attempt to offer what amounts to a general theory of lottery use. 
Pluralists, in contrast, deny that any such general theory is possible, or that there is any 
single property that can account for all of the things (good or bad) that lotteries can do.
Both oliver Dowlen, in The Political Potential of Sortition (2008), and Peter Stone, in 
The Luck of the Draw: The Role of Lotteries in Decision Making (2011), defend the monist 
position (see also Dowlen 2009 and Stone 2009, 2010a). Their accounts are similar. Both 
point to the fact that lotteries, due to their unpredictable nature, make decisions in a 
manner unconnected to rationality or reasons. Dowlen speaks of the “arationality” of 
lotteries as the fundamental contribution they make, whereas Stone argues that lotteries 
provide the sanitizing effect of a process unaffected by reasons. Dowlen and Stone do have 
some disagreements (Dowlen 2012; Stone 2010b, forthcoming). Both, for example, agree 
that lotteries have “weak” uses (in which the primary property of lotteries—the lack of 
connection to rationality/reasons—contributes nothing, even though it does not detract 
from decision-making) and “strong” uses (in which the primary property makes a positive 
15 Hubertus Buchstein argued at the workshop for including legitimacy and stability on this list. yann 
Allard-Tremblay also invoked the idea of legitimacy as a separate contribution sortition might make. 
We are not convinced that these constitute additions to the list. Whatever contribution sortition makes 
to legitimacy or stability probably takes place through the other contributions described above.
16 The discussion here applies more generally, to decision-making by lottery in general, not just to 
sortition. We will, however, maintain our focus on sortition here.
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contribution). The use of lotteries as a cheap, quick, and convenient decision-making tool, 
for example, is a weak use. But while both Dowlen and Stone acknowledge that lotteries 
can be used to ensure descriptive representation (to be discussed further shortly), Dowlen 
describes this use as weak, whereas Stone regards it as strong (see also Stone 2010b).
The distinction between strong and weak uses of lotteries is crucial to the monist position. 
For neither Dowlen nor Stone denies that lotteries can be used in ways that make no use of 
their essential property. A knife, for example, could simply be used as a paperweight, but if 
it is so used, it is not being used as a knife. Similarly, one could make a decision by rolling 
a die simply because it’s quick and cheap. But doing so does not use the lottery as a lottery; 
it makes no use of the property that distinguishes lotteries from other decision-making 
methods.17 There are also, quite obviously, arguments one could make for or against lottery 
use that do not refer to the property that lotteries share. A wealthy eccentric might try 
bribing a local government to select a zoning commission by lot; this might give the local 
government a reason to employ lotteries unrelated to the essential property of lotteries, but 
it does not defeat the claim that such an essential property exists.
Proponents of the monist position have surveyed numerous proposed contributions that 
lotteries might make, in order to show that they can safely be described in terms of a single 
contribution made under different circumstances. Peter Stone, for example, has critically 
scrutinized two major works on lotteries—Jon Elster’s Solomonic Judgments (1989) and 
Barbara Goodwin’s Justice by Lottery (2005)—and argued that all of the advantages and 
disadvantages discussed in these works can be expressed in terms of the sanitizing effect 
of a process unaffected by reasons (Stone 2009, 2010a). other scholars, however, remain 
sceptical of the idea of a general theory. And so they continue to offer lists of distinct 
contributions that lotteries can make to decision-making. A good example of such a list 
appears in Gil Delannoi’s “Reflections on Two Typologies for Random Selection” (2010), a 
list organized around the three central principles of equality, impartiality, and serenity. In 
his contribution to the workshop, Hubertus Buchstein also strongly endorsed the pluralist 
position and questioned the plausibility of a general theory of lottery use.
The contrast between monist and pluralist accounts of lottery use is, we believe, of serious 
theoretical importance, and worthy of further theoretical investigation. For the purposes 
17 Stone (2011, pp. 33-34) compares lotteries to elections in order to make this point. He also argues 
(ibid., pp. 42-44) that the ancient practice of divination via lottery (as in the I Ching) does not properly 
constitute decision-making via lottery (see also Stone 2010a, p. 159).
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of this report, however, we will set this particular debate aside, and focus our attention 
upon the list of advantages of sortition catalogued in this section. We will proceed both to 
the application of this list of advantages to the problem of democratic institutional design 
in the contemporary world, and to the theoretical problem of justifying and defending the 
various elements on this list. These tasks will be the focus of the second and third sections 
of this report, respectively.
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ParT 2: hoW can LoTTeries besT be incorPoraTeD inTo moDern
DemocraTic insTiTuTions?
It is difficult to address this question without first considering why it is that we might 
value sortition in the context of modern democracy. The question of How then follows 
logically as the means of achieving the desired solution.
one approach is to see the current interest in sortition as a response to perceived 
deficiencies or problems with the current paradigm of liberal democracy. There is a sense 
that the magnitude of the perceived need for sortive measures is in direct proportion to 
the dissatisfaction with liberal elective politics. A severe critic would like to see majority 
voting replaced by sortive measures, at least for some vital decision-making bodies (See 
Callenbach and Phillips 2008; Mueller et al. 1972; Sutherland 2004). A less severe critic 
would prefer to see sortition as a means of complementing and enhancing existing elective 
measures. A mild “improver”, on the other hand might envisage sortition as useful only 
on the margins of the body politic exiled to the judiciary (as it currently is) or confined to 
local municipalities.
The main line of critical thought—prefigured by writers such as Michels (1915) and 
Schumpeter (2010) and taken up more widely after the post WWII triumph of liberal 
democracy—is that the liberal democratic form encourages government, not by the 
people, but by competing elites. Despite electoral rights and the right of free political 
expression, a gap opens up between a professional political caste and the people at large. 
Citizen participation is limited to periodic voting and cheapened in that activity by the 
use of modern image-based advertising. Voting systems themselves are seen as unfair to 
entrenched minorities; the political process itself is seen as dominated by self-interested 
partisan groups, extra-political industrial lobby groups and career interests. The current 
interest in sortition can be seen first and foremost as a response to this situation, and the 
primary quality that sortition can bring to this context is seen as the delivery of much 
needed citizen participation to an arena dominated by these forces. In this respect the 
interest in sortition is part of the same political impulse that brought us participatory 
democracy and deliberative democracy.18  
A closer understanding of the qualities of the sortive process (the focus of this report’s 
first section) and the history of its use leads us to a somewhat different viewpoint. The 
18 Pateman (1970) and Barber (1984) are important examples of this.
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process of random selection is one that cannot be interfered with. It is strategy-proof and 
corruption-proof (at the level of selection, at least—the subsequent corruption of officials 
via lobbying, bribery, etc. is a different matter). It denies the power of appointment to 
political actors and thus it can contribute to the breakup of concentrations of power 
within the body politic. This anti-factional, anti-partisan role is manifest in its use in 
the late medieval city republics of north Italy and (arguably) underpins its systematic and 
widespread use in Ancient Athens (Dowlen 2008). From this point of view sortition has 
the capacity to generate citizen participation, but the random mechanism has the capacity 
to bring other attributes with it.19 The proposition to use sortition merely and simply to 
facilitate citizen participation would constitute, in fact, a weak use of sortition since, 
stated thus, there is no real need to use an arational decision-making procedure.20 
Understanding this enables us to approach the Why? question from another direction. 
If we want to see improvements in the quality of the political process, fairer politics, 
more open politics, politics insulated against factional intrigue, partisan manipulation 
and authoritarian domination, then the carefully managed use of sortition can help to 
realise this vision. Randomly-selected political bodies can function, in effect, as impartial 
guardians of the political system, provided they are properly constituted and assigned the 
right tasks. It is difficult to think of a selection method more suitable for this function than 
sortition.21 What is more, because an appointment by sortition is unmediated by any third 
party or interest group, widespread use of sortition can create a new direct relationship 
between citizen and state. This can be one in which, by careful constitutional planning, 
the citizenry can be instrumental in protecting the integrity of the political system itself.
 
We start, therefore, from the premise that citizen participation may be a desirable good, 
but that citizen participation in defence of an open, fair, inclusive, rule governed polity is 
a desirable good more commensurate with the qualities of the lottery process. The question 
of How? can now be addressed with greater clarity.
 
19 See Stone’s “sanitizing effect” (Stone 2011) and Delannoi’s highlighting of the quality of serenity 
(Delannoi 2011).
20 See Dowlen (2008, pp 11-30) for the formulation of the distinction between weak and strong use.
21 Traditionally, courts are viewed as agents for this form of impartial guardianship (cf. Shapiro 2003, 
p. 64). But the limits of the “apolitical” nature of courts are also well-known. This raises an important 
issue for proponents of sortition—the virtues and disadvantages of appointed judges versus randomly-
selected juries. There is a vast literature on this topic that is worthy of detailed exploration.
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The first question that demands attention is whether sortition should be used instead 
of, or in combination with election. There may well be better arguments in support of a 
combination. If we are seeking a fairer system of government, with a greater emphasis on 
the rule-governed control of political power, then it is clear that here are many aspects 
of the process of consent by election that serve to promote these ends (Manin 1997). 
Moreover voting, despite all its defects in the aggregation of votes, is a system that involves 
the conscious decision-making capacity of the citizen body. This would be denied by a 
totally sortive system. It should also be recognised that sortition and liberal democracy 
belong to the same tradition of open participatory government; to this extent they are not 
in competition with each other (Dowlen 2010). Furthermore in historical practice they 
were invariably used with each other, each taking a distinct role in the entire process of 
selecting officers, or each used to select a different type of officer. The arational is used 
in combination with the rational. A move to an entirely sortive scheme might constitute 
a step in the dark and would therefore only be justified by the existence of an overriding 
reason to adopt an arational mechanism in preference to a rationally based system in all 
its aspects. Such a reason might be the complete bankruptcy or corruption of electoral 
politics. Even then an exclusively sortive scheme could be resorted to as a temporary 
measure rather than as a permanent institution.
 
one of the most straightforward ways that sortition and election could work well together 
would involve a bicameral system where election was used for one legislative chamber 
and sortition for the other.22 In such cases it might make sense that each chamber should 
have a constitutionally distinct role so that it would be very clear where legislative 
sovereignty lay (Barnett and Carty 2008). An alternative to this would be a single chamber 
with members selected by sortition sitting alongside elected members (Peonidis 2010). 
This could, indeed, temper some of the excessive partisanship of the elected members, but 
22 Proposals of this nature have been made for the U.S. by Mueller et al. (1972), McCormick (2006); 
o’Leary (2006); Callenbach and Phillips (2008); and Zakaras (2010); for the UK by Barnett and Carty 
(2008) and Sutherland (2004, 2008); for France by Sintomer (2007); and for the EU by Buchstein and 
Hein (2009).
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the presence of citizen members amongst professional politicians could also work to the 
detriment of the citizens unless each were given specific roles and duties.23 
 
A proposal for such a bicameral system would make the most sense if the two legislative 
chambers had distinct functions, with the randomly-selected chamber taking on a “non-
political” role of maintaining the integrity of the political process as a whole. A good 
example of such a proposal would be Barnett and Carty’s (2008) proposal to reform the 
UK’s House of Lords. Barnett and Carty would have a randomly-selected body of “Peers 
in Parliament” (PPs) empowered to reject legislation sent to it by an elected House of 
Commons on three specific grounds. The PPs would be entitled to 1) “reject legislation that 
undermines the principles of constitutional democracy;” 2) “return non-fiscal legislation 
that it believes will not achieve the objectives the government claims and to insist that the 
government reformulates either its aims or its legislation;” and 3) “insist that legislation be 
drafted in a way that citizens can understand” (ibid., p. 37; see also Stone, forthcoming). 
A legislative house with such powers might well strengthen the ties between citizen and 
government without unduly interfering with the legislative process.
 
A further option could be to use randomly-selected citizens, not in direct (or even indirect) 
competition with elected members, but in a support role. Here again the role of randomly-
selected bodies as guardians of the political process comes to the fore. A development 
of Ségolène Royal’s scheme for citizens’ juries to hold elected officers to account would 
fit in this category. (Royal included this proposal in her manifesto for the 2007 French 
presidential campaign.) Instead of being cast in an adversarial role, however, a group of 
citizens could be selected both to oversee and to assist the elected member. This could be 
done by the citizens acting as the interface between the member and the constituency, 
handling appointments, public appearances, press releases, receipt of petitions etc. In this 
way citizens would begin to have a greater insight into the work of their representatives, 
and the sitting member would have closer links with the constituency without always 
working for party advantage. In this role the citizens would be members of the state rather 
23 In 2010, a group called Repair California called for a referendum that would create a convention 
to overhaul the state constitution. The convention would have been comprised of professional 
politicians, representatives of Native American tribes, and randomly-selected citizens. The effort to 
place the proposal on the ballot failed due to lack of funds, but some critics claimed that the complex 
and unwieldy convention proposal made it difficult to justify to voters. In December 2012, Ireland 
convened an Irish Constitutional Convention to make non-binding recommendations on possible 
constitutional reforms. This convention also features both elected representatives and randomly-
selected citizens, and has met with criticisms similar to those directed at Repair California’s proposal. 
on the Irish case, see https://www.constitution.ie/.
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than of government: they would help to ensure the probity and smooth-running of the 
system rather than make decisions in a representative capacity.
 
one of the main arguments for this type of arrangement is that the role of the citizens as 
impartial guardians of the political system is entirely commensurate with their method of 
selection. The role of the MP’s oversight committee is similar to that of the tribune in the 
Roman Republic. They act as citizen witnesses to inner workings of the political system. 
once this principle is grasped it is possible to envisage numerous similar applications. 
Randomly-selected citizens could be incorporated into the management boards of 
nationalised industries or other state owned concerns; secret services could be monitored 
for acts against the interests of the citizenry; the rules governing legislative ethics could 
be created and enforced by either standing or occasional allotted chambers; elections in 
emerging democracies could be monitored by randomly-selected citizens; the decision 
whether it would be in the public interest to disclose certain confidential matters of state 
could be made by citizens juries.24 A randomly-selected constitutional convention might 
also reasonably be included in this category, and indeed sortition is often mentioned 
as a device appropriate for this purpose. (Ètienne Chouard stressed this point during
the workshop.)
 
Where this category of use differs from the use of randomly-selected citizens in legislative 
or executive bodies is that citizens in the former would be expected to represent the general 
interest in their protection of open participatory government. In a randomly-selected 
chamber based on the principle of descriptive representation, citizens would be expected, 
in some sense, to act according to their self-interest or the interest of the grouping(s) of 
which they were a part. This point is, of course, a contentious one. It has both theoretical 
and empirical components. Theoretically, it raises the question of which model of politics 
best accounts for the (hypothesized) importance of descriptive representation—a liberal 
one, a republican one, or some other possibility (Habermas 1994). Empirically, it raises 
the question of how different models of democracy predict different forms of political 
24 We acknowledge Dr Keith Nilsen for this idea along with the proposal to use randomly-selected 
monitors for the secret services. See preface to Dowlen (2008).
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behaviour, and which predictions are best borne out by the facts. Both types of question, 
we believe, are worthy of careful future investigation.25 
 
There is another sense in which the role of citizens as impartial guardians of the political 
system is commensurate with random selection. one of the most devastating criticisms 
made of electoral democracy is that it generates a massive problem of rational ignorance. 
Citizens have a negligible chance of influencing which candidates get elected, and an 
equally negligible chance of influence those candidates once elected. Citizens thus have 
no incentive to become well-informed regarding political affairs (Downs 1957). If sortition 
were used to fill certain political offices, the probability that a citizen would win office 
would be very small, and the possibility of influencing the selection process (however 
small it may be under election) would become zero. But citizens selected for office would 
have every incentive to become well-informed about political topics relevant to the office 
in question. This suggests that sortition should be reserved for public offices which do not 
require a lifetime of political experience, where the relevant training can be handled by 
highly-motivated amateurs in a short time. The roles associated with the guardianship of 
the political process fit this bill quite well.26 
 
Even when guardianship requires expertise, this expertise need not come directly from 
the relevant decision-makers. Suppose, for example, a randomly-selected committee faced 
the task of drawing or redrawing the boundaries of electoral districts. This task seems 
easy to classify as one of impartial guardianship of the integrity of the political system. 
But it also seems to call for a certain political expertise. There is no reason in principle, 
however, why such a committee could not simply commission several such plans and then 
select the most attractive one. The successful function of such a committee will, of course, 
depend upon the proper selection of other institutional features besides sortition.
 
25 It is worth adding, as Stephen Elstub pointed out during the workshop, that interests require 
legitimate expression in any well-functioning political process. If randomly-selected bodies are 
not the appropriate place for this expression, some other forum must be devised. This provides yet 
another reason to envision a variety of political institutions—some constituted via sortition, some 
not—complementing each other.
26 In addition, a system with many such guardian roles would provide many opportunities for 
citizens to participate. While the probability that a citizen will be selected for any one role at a given 
time will remain low, the probability that a citizen will be selected for some such role at some point in 
her life could become substantial. That may provide citizens with some incentive to acquire political 
knowledge. But because of the nature of the offices in question, and because the citizen has no of 
telling which office she will take up, she cannot systematically pursue political knowledge for venal 
purposes.
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A further difficult question concerns the nature and extent of necessary training. The old 
aristocratic argument against sortition was that those selected in this manner would lack 
the specialist skills needed for government.27 This is not, however, a coherent argument 
against the sortive principle itself for it is the duty of the rational designer of any scheme 
to match the general capacities of those in the pool with the requirements of the post for 
which they might be selected. Another variable in this scheme is the possible simplification 
of the tasks of office to suit the wide range of abilities that would be found in citizen-wide 
pool. The Athenians, in fact, adopted this solution and arranged that magistrates should 
work in boards of ten so they could assist each other (Headlam 1933). The provision of 
training is also a means by which those in the pool, or those selected, can be made ready 
for the demands of the office in question.
 
Here again there is a contrast with the assumptions underlying the use of sortition for 
descriptive representation. With descriptive representation it is necessary that those 
selected take office without training so that they bring the diversity of their educational 
backgrounds into the decision-making of the chamber. Special training for the tasks of 
office could be seen as interfering with that principle. Callenbach and Philips (2008), in 
their defence of a randomly-selected U.S. House of Representatives, make precisely this 
point. Indeed, they go so far as to defend the fact that members of this House will be lazy 
and inattentive in direct proportion to the number of lazy and inattentive members of the 
general public!
 
The question of the content of the training could be problematic, but if citizens were 
selected to protect what they could recognise as their political institutions, then this 
would provide an incentive for them to do the job to the best of their abilities. The content 
of training in such a context would present no problems since it would reflect the impartial 
nature of the office rather than having any specific partisan ideological mission.28 
 
Participation in sortive offices would therefore be a two way process: the citizens would 
bring their diversity, experience and new energies to the body politic, while the office 
itself would educate the citizen in respect to means and methods of their political system. 
27 See Socrates’ criticism of sortition along these lines (Dowlen 2008, pp. 57-58).
28 Cf. Fishkin (2009), who strongly defends the idea that randomly-selected public officials can be 
provided with training and support in an impartial manner. Critics of Fishkin are less sanguine on 
this point.
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In addition the very existence of citizen offices would sharpen and place new demands on 
the provision for citizenship training within the general education system. 
 
Another important question concerning the incorporation of sortive methods within 
modern democracies is whether sortition should be voluntary or compulsory. In other 
words, should those selected by lottery be required to serve in the office for which they 
were selected, or should the pools for office consist only of those who put themselves 
forward for the post in question. If sortition was to be used for the purpose of descriptive 
representation this would require compulsory selection, but for other functions of sortition 
the question is more open. An argument against the voluntary principle is that the offices 
would end up being staffed by those who were already committed or active, and these 
people might be merely bringing their own pre-determined interests and ambitions into 
the body politic. In these circumstances there would be no lowering of the threshold of 
participation so that “ordinary” citizens could hold office and the potential for diversity 
generated by the lottery principle would be lost. on the other hand there could be real 
problems if sortive offices were entirely staffed by reluctant conscripts.29 
 
one of the difficulties with this question is that it is normally formulated in the context 
of today’s non-participatory society where any compromise to an individual’s free time 
and personal liberty is regarded as a burden. We would envisage that any society that 
implemented a comprehensive programme of sortition for public offices would also 
address the question of how citizens could be suitably motivated and rewarded. We do 
not see sortive schemes operating successfully in a vacuum or in a hostile environment, 
but in circumstance where a general ethos of the duties and responsibilities of citizenship 
has a high profile.30 Sortive offices could operate easily in a system where, for instance, 
compulsory social conscription was the norm and in which a system of tax breaks and 
special payment provisions could act as incentives for those taking and holding office.31 In 
such circumstances it could be possible to combine compulsory offices of shorter duration 
with offices that required greater long-term commitment that operated on a voluntary or 
quasi voluntary basis. The guiding principle should be that the point of entry to the body 
politic should be compulsory (whether it be an office or a special course) and that joining 
29 A discussion along these lines took place on the final day of the November 2011 Paris seminar.
30 A note should be made here of the importance of rotation in combination with sortition. Clearly 
different terms of tenure for office could be used to make a range of offices from “entry level” to 
“advanced commitment.”
31 It is an open question how serious a challenge such participatory demands would pose to the idea 
of a liberal society. Space prohibits us from doing more than mentioning the issue here.
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the pools for subsequent offices could be voluntary. In this way the diversity and the low 
threshold can be maintained. To organise this efficiently, however, some sort of ranking of 
the pools for different offices and the careful stipulation of the requirements for any pools 
that were not simply citizen-wide would be necessary. 
 
We will conclude this section by separating two distinct problematics governing the 
question of applying sortive based schemes in modern democracies. The first involves 
sortition as a mechanism for solving specific, discrete political problems. In this arena the 
central principle is that sortition should be used when a positive use can be made of the 
one or more of the essential qualities of the lottery procedure in respect to the task in hand. 
This judgement would also involve assessing whether the positive advantages of using 
an arational, nonhuman mechanism outweigh the possible disadvantages, and whether 
these disadvantages can be addressed by other aspects of the procedure as a whole. As in 
all design thinking, a clear assessment of objectives is an absolute prerequisite, and the 
arational lottery process then becomes an option in a process of clear, deliberate, rational 
calculation. Presented in this way, sortition could command more consideration as a 
serious political problem-solving mechanism.
 
The second problematic relates to the larger picture of the trajectory of liberal democracy 
and its perceived limitations. The questions raised under this heading are more profound, 
far reaching and fundamental in their nature. Rather than asking how we can select 
members for this or that committee or choose monitors for this or that governmental 
operation, problems in this arena involve complex questions such as whether there is 
an inevitable trend towards oligarchy in party electoral politics (Michels 1915; but see 
Alford 1985), whether more elements of direct democracy should be introduced and to 
what effect, and whether the interface between civil and political society operates fairly. 
These, and more, questions form the background to the inquiry into the value of the wider 
advocacy of sortition as a new re-regenerative element in modern world democracy.
 
We started to answer the question How? with the question Why? We then raised the 
issue of participation. It is easy to see participation as a good in its own right and to see 
sortition as a tool by which this can be put into effect. our response would be to invert 
the argument and suggest that in the greater task of protecting the integrity of the open, 
fair political process, citizen participation is an incredibly powerful tool, particularly 
because a citizen-wide pool is almost impossible to corrupt or to bring under the will of 
any powerful individual or party. This is a largely instrumental view of democracy, but 
one that is consistent with the acknowledgment of important democratic rights. once 
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this central principle has been grasped, the question How? can be answered in numerous 
inventive ways.
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ParT 3: WhaT QuesTions reGarDinG LoTTeries remain for
fuTure research?
The first section of this report offered a list of eight potential contributions that sortition 
might potentially make to politics. The second made a case for the use of randomly-selected 
bodies of citizens as guardians of the integrity and impartiality of the political process. 
In this final section, we will use this case in order to re-examine and re-evaluate our list 
of contributions. This re-examination and re-evaluation will be tentative. It will provide, 
not a conclusive argument, but a tentative one designed to motivate future research into 
the theory and practice of sortition. Such research would usefully advance, not simply our 
understanding of sortition, but our understanding of democratic theory as a whole.
 
As noted in the first section of this report, one can ask two vitally important questions 
about each of the eight contributions associated with sortition. First, does sortition indeed 
provide the contribution in question? Second, is the contribution in question really of 
value, and why? Convincing answers are needed to both questions for each contribution 
before one could reasonably endorse sortition as a means to that contribution.
 
It should be clear by now that the largest contribution we believe sortition can make to 
modern democratic politics is the prevention of corruption and domination. We would 
conceive of sortition as a means to select officials charged with preserving the integrity 
of the political process. We believe that sortition, properly institutionalized, can make 
such a contribution (although further empirical study here is definitely warranted), and 
that such a contribution would go a significant way towards addressing the widespread 
dissatisfaction with democratic institutions today. We also believe that some of the other 
contributions, notably the mitigation of elite-level conflict and the control of political 
outliers, are closely related to this one. (The psychological benefits of sortition might well 
fit into this category, but this is more of a speculative possibility at this time, and further 
research here ought to be conducted.) other contributions, particularly participation, 
rotation, and distributive justice, are less important, unless construed in such a way as to 
tie them to the prevention of corruption and domination.
Take, for example, the question of rotation. There is no doubt that random selection can 
generate regular turnover among officeholders. This is true even if, for some reason, 
officeholders were permitted to enter the random draw repeatedly. In any large-scale 
polity, the probability that any single person will be selected twice for the same office 
in her lifetime (let alone twice in a row) is vanishingly small. But sortition is simply not 
PART 3
THE LOTTERY AS A DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION
33
necessary to accomplish this purpose. Elections, when combined with term limits, can 
accomplish this aim just as easily, as can any other selection methods with short terms of 
office and a bar upon reappointment. The use of sortition as a method for attaining rotation 
is thus a weak use of the lottery at best.
 
The most controversial potential contribution of sortition to democratic politics is, we 
believe, descriptive representation. The controversy does not reside in the connection 
between sortition and descriptive representation. There is no denying that sortition can, 
under the appropriate conditions, advance this value. (These conditions include, for 
example, the requirement that participation in the random selection process be mandatory.) 
Indeed, sortition arguably accomplishes this task better than any other procedure.32 Rather, 
the controversy lies at the level of the value of descriptive representation. Why, in other 
words, does descriptive representation matter for democratic politics? Why should it be a 
good thing for democracy that a decision-making body “mirrors” the general population?
 
The answer to this question is, we believe, key to establishing a defensible account 
of sortition’s contribution to democracy. Sortition proponents frequently disparage 
electoral democracy’s democratic credentials. And while some recognize that political 
systems employing lotteries need not be democratic,33 most share Aristotle’s view that 
election is an inherently aristocratic selection process, while sortition is in inherently 
democratic.34 Ètienne Chouard, in his contribution to the workshop, went so far as to 
dismiss representative democracy as an “oxymoron.” And the connection they perceive 
between sortition and democracy—a connection they do not perceive between election 
and democracy—runs through descriptive representation. Descriptive representation 
makes it possible for political bodies to mirror the general public, and this is enough to 
make them second-best to direct democracy, whose democratic credentials are of course 
impeccable. But why should this mirroring relation be so critical to democracy?
 
Typically, the answer offered to this question is that a body that “looks like” the population 
as a whole will make decisions that have some positive relation with the population as a 
32 As noted in the first section, Dowlen believes the connection between sortition and descriptive 
representation to be weak; Stone contends that it is strong.
33 Hubertus Buchstein stressed this point during the workshop.
34 We are more sympathetic to Bernard Manin’s (1997) contention that elections have an aristocratic 
and a democratic side to them.
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whole. But what precisely is this positive relationship? How might one individual or group 
relate to another in a positive way? The possibilities include the following:35 
a) I am like you.
b) I share your interests.
c) I represent your interests.
d) I make good decisions.
e) I do what you want me to do, or I do what you would have done.
f) I do what you would want me to do, or what you would have done, in some hypothetical 
set of circumstances (e.g., if you were better informed—this is sometimes described as 
the achievement of “enlightened public opinion”).
g) you selected me to make these decisions.
h) I have been authorized to act on your behalf.
i) I have been authorized by you to act on your behalf.
Typically, the case for descriptive representation presupposes some systematic 
relationship among these elements. The case, for example, might be that a) implies b), 
which in turn implies c), which is defined to be equivalent to d). If I am like you, then I 
share your interests, therefore I represent your interests. And if I represent your interests, 
my decisions will be good. one might also add to this the idea that d) implies f), or vice 
versa. A good decision might simply be defined as the decision you would have made 
under the right hypothetical circumstances. The challenge would then be to make sure 
that I, as your representative, make this “good” decision for you. Finally, Keith Sutherland 
has in recent work suggested that a) might imply i), or at least h), even though it is more 
typical for g) and i) (as well as g) and c)) to be connected via elections. Typically, we think 
of elections as authorizing representation—you select me, and that is why I am authorized 
to represent you, but Sutherland argues (following Fishkin) that I might be authorized to 
represent you simply by virtue of being like you.
 
Many of these connections, however, are far from obvious. For example, it will be very 
difficult to connect f) and a) except through c). If I make the same decision as you would 
make in some hypothetical scenario, it is presumably because that decision properly 
advances your interests, and under that hypothetical scenario you would figure this out. 
This point is important, because if the interests of an agent and the goals of an agent come 
35 For a similar consideration of descriptive representation, see the exchange in Griffiths and 
Wollheim (1960).
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apart, one must decide which is most important to the political process. (The two will 
come apart any time an agent decides to sacrifice its interests in order to advance some 
other goal—e.g., when a wealthy polity decides to send money to help AIDS orphans in 
Africa.) Moreover, it is very difficult to evaluate the claim that I would do something 
under some hypothetical set of circumstances unless the circumstances are specified very 
clearly—and even then, it will be much harder to evaluate the claim for a collective body. 
The situation is clearer, though still theoretically complex in the collective case, if the 
goal is simply to connect likeness to the advancement of interests.
 
It is, however, the connection of i), or even h), to a) that poses the most problems. Why 
should the mere fact that I am like you convey any kind of authorization to act upon your 
behalf? Admittedly, the connection of g) to i) is tenuous at best, despite the efforts of the 
social contract theory tradition. My ability to select my representatives provides at best a 
very weak form of authorization. For according to the social contract tradition, I am taken 
to have authorized a government to make various decisions affecting me even if:
- I did not vote in any election determining the composition of the government;
- I voted for a variety of candidates for the government, and they all lost;
- I voted for a variety of candidates for the government, but none of them became part of 
the new government;
- I voted for a variety of candidates for the government because they promised to take 
certain actions, and while those candidates did become part of the government they 
failed to take any of those actions; or even
- I voted against the enactment of the constitution creating the procedures for authorizing 
the government, and have not voted in any way since then.
Many of these conclusions seem counterintuitive, even absurd, as they attribute my 
authorization to actions or inactions that would never be understood that way in any 
non-political sphere.
 
But descriptive representation makes matters even worse. With voting, there is at least 
a chance that I will vote for a candidate who both wins and is willing and able to fulfil 
his campaign promises. There is at least some sense in which I can be said to authorize 
such a candidate to act for me. But even this sense does not exist when sortition is used 
to generate descriptive representation, for sortition ensures there will be no relationship 
between the candidates that I want and the candidates that are selected.
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There are two potential ways out of this, neither very promising. on the one hand, one 
could point to the constitutional procedure that authorizes sortition. If I vote for the 
procedure, then one could claim that I have indirectly authorized the candidates selected 
by it. But this does not help the case for sortition. The problem of authorization by those 
who vote against the procedures, or refuse to vote at all, remains the same as before. 
Moreover, whatever authorization that constitutional enactment provides does not favour 
sortition in any way. If a constitutional ratification process can be said to provide collective 
authorization for sortition, then that same process would surely provide collective 
authorization for voting, or hereditary monarchy, or any other selection procedure that 
might survive the ratification process.36 But on the other hand, one could try to articulate 
a positive case for why descriptive representation produces some sort of authorization. As 
with voting, this type of authorization would never happen outside a political context; 
other people are not authorized to sublet my apartment, or buy my groceries, without my 
consent simply because they resemble me, however closely.
 
The problem of descriptive representation runs deep. It is one of the most commonly 
evoked reasons in favour of sortition (understandably, given how efficiently sortition 
achieving this goal). yet there remain deep questions regarding just why descriptive 
representation is supposed to be important—what values it represents and advances—and 
how those values fit with other values. Most importantly, as the discussion here indicates, 
descriptive representation raises the question of just what democracy is all about, whether 
there even exists a single democratic value or closely-connected set of democratic values. 
Most commonly, the attempt to define democratic values focuses upon authorization in 
some form or another. Democracy is defined in terms of self-government, which is taken 
to mean government by the consent of the governed. Elections were supposed to enable 
such government, and some proponents of sortition propose sortition as a response to the 
failure of elections to accomplish this goal. But the argument so far has shown why both 
sortition and elections fall so far short of accomplishing this goal as to raise the question 
whether the goal is achievable at all. And if the goal of government by the consent of the 
36 Goodwin (2005) envisages a sortition-based constitution enjoying this form of collective 
authorization. Stone (2011, section 3.3) critiques Goodwin’s argument.
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governed is not achievable, then the question becomes what sort of story about democracy 
is both feasible and desirable, and how does sortition fit into that story.37 
 
For this reason, we are sceptical of the case for descriptive representation. We do not have 
a knock-down argument against it. Rather, we believe that descriptive representation is 
one of the weaker theoretical foundations upon which erect the case for sortition in the 
modern world. But this is not a reason to neglect the case for the lottery as a means to 
descriptive representation. Rather, it provides a reason for rethinking the foundations of 
democratic theory, in such a way as to illuminate the connection sortition has to these 
foundations. That connection may or may not involve descriptive representation, but we 
are far more confident that it will involve advancing other democratic values, such as the 
prevention of domination.
 
Before proceeding, we hasten to add that we in no way reject the goal of ensuring that 
voices from all segments of society are able to find their way into the political process. 
But the connection between this goal and descriptive representation is less clear than is 
commonly assumed. This goal is important for several reasons, most notably the epistemic 
benefits provided by cognitive diversity. But these benefits require that a variety of voices 
in the general population be heard, not that voices from the general population be heard 
in proportion to their presence in the general population, as descriptive representation 
demands. Indeed, the demands of cognitive diversity might require the overrepresentation 
of certain small and marginal social groups with a vital stake in the decisions at hand. 
(The opinion of gays and lesbians on gay marriage would be an example of this.) The 
representation of opinions or discourses might matter a lot to democracy (Dryzek 1994), 
but this does not straightforwardly generate a case for descriptive representation (Stone 
(2012a). one can, in short, reject the goal of descriptive representation and still embrace 
the goal of diversity in the decision-making process. The latter goal can be sustained and 
defended in ways that the former cannot.
 
37 Cf. Plamenatz (1968, p. 3; see also pp. 23-24): if both direct and representative democracy
 are only to a limited extent governments by consent, it will necessarily follow either that consent 
is not the sole basis of the duty of the governed to obey their rulers or else that there exists in every 
state, however democratic, a large number of persons under no obligation to obey its laws. The latter 
conclusion is suspect from the start, for no state could perform its functions if it contained a large 
number of citizens exempt from obedience to its laws. There remains, therefore, only the former 
conclusion, that consent cannot be the sole basis of the duty in question, thought it may well be one 
of them.
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Sustained reflection upon the contributions that sortition can make to democratic politics 
(reflection at which we can only gesture here through our brief exploration of descriptive 
representation et al.) is important for two reasons. First, the decision to use sortition is 
always accompanied by a myriad of other institutional design decisions. Getting the first of 
these decisions right is critically important if the other decisions are to be made correctly 
as well. Second, sortition is always one of several options on the table for selecting political 
officials; if sortition is to be selected over its rivals, the advantages and disadvantages it 
offers must be made crystal clear. By way of a conclusion to this report, we will elaborate 
upon and defend both of these claims.
 
First, consider the question of what institutional features should be used in conjunction 
with sortition. The simple recognition that random selection has properties that may prove 
desirable in democratic politics does not straightforwardly generate a case for sortition. 
For democratic institutions are complex things. Random selection can fit into them in 
numerous ways, and in conjunction with numerous different design features. Moreover, 
the selection of one design feature cannot be made independently of the selection of other 
design features. In his book Equalities, Douglas Rae argued that the concept of equality 
has numerous dimensions that any meaningful egalitarian theory of justice must specify. 
If a theory gets even one of these dimensions wrong, it could completely negate the value 
of the theory even if choices are made correctly along all of the other dimensions (Rae 
1981). Democratic institutional design, we believe, works in a similar way. A democratic 
institution has numerous features that must be selected properly, and improper selection 
of any one of them could conceivably sabotage the proper selection of the rest.
 
The most important institutional question is, of course, just what is supposed to be selected 
by lot. Virtually all proponents of sortition answer, “political officials.” None, to the best 
of our knowledge, would select policies at random. But some are attracted to the idea of 
lottery voting (otherwise known as the “random dictator” rule). According to this rule, 
people make decisions by voting, but the votes are not counted; instead, a single vote is 
selected at random, and that vote determines the outcome. This rule has some surprisingly 
attractive properties. In particular, it is strategy-proof; it provides voters with no incentive 
to vote for any candidate other than the one they most prefer (Gibbard 1977). For this 
reason, it has a number of partisans (e.g., Amar 1984), but it has received little attention by 
proponents of sortition.
 
Assume, then, that random selection is to be used to select political officials. Then the 
second most critical question to answer regarding sortition is just what sorts of tasks are 
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best performed by randomly-selected officials. The possible answers are numerous. The 
policymaking process has many stages to it, including agenda formation, debate, record-
keeping, implementation, and review. Randomly-selected bodies could be employed to try 
cases, make or implement administrative decisions, enact laws, or nominate and/or elect 
candidates for other offices. This last usage has attracted little recent attention among 
proponents of sortition, but it is historically important; Renaissance Venice used sortition 
for this purpose, in a political system that survived for half a millennium and was the 
envy of republicans throughout the western world (Finlay 1980). It certainly merits further 
attention; it might fit well into the category of “guardians of the political system” that we 
believe might properly be associated with sortition.
 
once the decision has been made to select randomly a body of officials to perform a 
task, numerous other institutional features must still be chosen. Should candidates be 
volunteers? Should they be allowed to volunteer? Should they be nominated by others for 
including in the random selection, but given the opportunity to decline? Should everyone 
be included in the random draw, whether they like it or not? And once the body has been 
selected, how should it make its decisions? Should it be required to deliberate? Should it 
be allowed to participate? With what sources of information should it be provided? Should 
it be empowered to select its own sources? Should others have the right to speak to it, or 
provide evidence? If so, under what conditions? Will those selected be required to attend? 
If so, how should attendance be enforced? Should other performance requirements be 
enforced upon them? What mechanisms, if any, might be required to hold them accountable 
for their actions? Should the body vote, or pursue consensus (as with the Anglo-American 
jury)? Should it vote secretly or openly? Should its vote be recorded? Should it simply 
make decisions, or should it be compelled to present reasons for its decision? And finally, 
should its decisions be binding or merely advisory? This last question currently attracts 
a great deal of attention; it lies at the heart of the debate between defenders and critics of 
James Fishkin’s deliberative opinion polls (Fishkin 2009).
 
Consider one of these questions in further detail—the question of accountability (an issue 
raised by Ètienne Chouard during the workshop). Representative democracy has long been 
based upon what Judith Shklar called the “liberalism of fear” (Shklar 1998), with elections 
providing the accountability that ensures even less-than-saintly politicians will behave 
themselves. Elections may not provide this accountability as reliably as the founders of 
representative democracy believed (Shapiro 2003, p. 60), but the fact remains that sortition 
has no conceptual connection with a similar accountability mechanism. This does not 
imply that sortition inherently leads to accountability, but it does imply that care must 
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be taken in generating the appropriate mechanisms for accomplishing this task. Scholars 
concerned with democracy have begun to devote attention to the various mechanisms 
available to ensure accountability (Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999). Sortition should 
be considered as part of this research programme, which considers the general problem of 
motivating public actors to serve the public interest.
 
The question of accountability brings us to the second of our two concluding questions. 
Just as one must consider what institutional features should be used in conjunction 
with sortition, so must one consider how sortition compares to other methods for 
assigning public responsibilities. Sortition is, of course, only one of several alternative 
methods of selecting political officials. Elections are another. Appointment is another. 
Indeed, these three methods are the primary alternatives considered appropriate today 
for selecting political officials (Stone 2012b). And of course, each of these alternatives 
involves countless variations—elections, for example, can be conducted using any one 
of a vast array of possible voting rules. Is one of these alternatives demonstrably superior 
to the others in all cases? Unlikely. If not, which alternative is appropriate under which 
circumstances? When can voters make good decisions in selecting officials, in the sense 
of doing markedly better than pure chance? When does randomization make a positive 
contribution to the selection process? Is it possible to specify appointment procedures 
that avoid the pitfalls of election and outperform sortition? Modern democratic theory has 
taken the superiority of elections for granted. Proponents of sortition should not repeat 
this mistake by presuming the superiority of sortition. Democratic theory must truly be 
comparative, examining impartially and dispassionately the respective contributions and 
limitations of all alternative methods compatible with its basic values.
 
Any comparative investigation of alternative selection mechanisms must remember that 
political positions are not filled in a vacuum. How well randomly-selected office X functions 
will depend critically upon both the existence of office y and the selection mechanism 
employed by y. one typical complaint made against randomly-selected legislatures, for 
example, is that they would greatly increase legislative amateurism. Whatever the other 
virtues of such amateurism may be, they would (according to this argument) result in a 
massive transfer of power to the bureaucracy, which can be assumed to have much more 
stable long-term interests of its own. Elections, by contrast, create opportunities for career 
politicians with the expertise to discipline and control bureaucrats. This argument, 
of course, makes several critical assumptions. It assumes, for example, that elected 
officials can be effectively disciplined by voters, and that those officials will through this 
disciplinary process share more interests with voters than with bureaucrats. But whatever 
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its validity, this argument raises the critical question of how randomly-selected bodies 
will interact with elected and appointed officials. This question must be addressed if 
democratic institutional design is to be studied in a truly comparative manner.
 
Investigation of both of these questions regarding sortition will require theoretical 
work, historical research, as well as continued use of small-scale experiments involving 
sortition (Fishkin 2009).38 Research into sortition should remain interdisciplinary, and 
be integrated more fully into the study of democratic politics. For while this report can 
offer some tentative lessons about the proper role of sortition in modern democracy, there 
remains much work to be done.
38 During the workshop, however, Peter Stone cautioned against drawing ambitious conclusions about 
sortition solely from the small-scale experiments. Institutions may function one way on the periphery 
of society and quite another way when they become mainstream. See Elster (1993) on this point.
PART 3
THE LOTTERY AS A DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION
42
bibLioGraPhy
Alford, C. Fred. “The ‘Iron Law of oligarchy’ in the Athenian Polis...and Today.” Canadian 
Journal of Political Science 18:2 (June 1985): 295-312.
Amar, Akhil Reed. “Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting,” Yale Law Journal 93 
(1984): 1283-1308.
Bachrach, Peter. The Theory of Democratic Elitism. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967.
Barber, Benjamin R. Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1984.
Barnett, Anthony and Carty, Peter. The Athenian Option. Radical Reform for the House of 
Lords. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008.
Buchstein, Hubertus and Hein, Michael. “Randomizing Europe: The Lottery as a Decision-
Making Procedure for Policy Creation in the EU.” Critical Policy Studies 3, no. 1 (April 
2009): 29-57.
Burgers, Jan-Willem. “An Athenian Response to Corruption.” Paper presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 2011.
Burgers, Jan-Willem. “Choice by Chance: An Exploration into the Practice and Virtues of 
Using Lotteries in Public Choices.” Ph.D. Dissertation, the Australian National University, 
2013.
Burnheim, John. Is Democracy Possible? 2nd ed. Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2006.
Callenbach, Ernest and Phillips, Michael. “A Citizen Legislature.” In Callenbach, Philips, 
and Sutherland (2008).
Callenbach, Ernest; Phillips, Michael; and Sutherland, Keith. A Citizen Legislature/A 
People’s Parliament. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008.
Carson, Lyn and Martin, Brian. Random Selection in Politics. Westport, CT: Praeger, 
1999.
BIBLIoGRAPHy
THE LOTTERY AS A DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION
43
Constant, Benjamin. “The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns.” 
In Political Writings. New york: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Delannoi, Gil. “Reflections on Two Typologies for Random Selection.” In Gil Delannoi and 
oliver Dowlen, eds. Sortition: Theory and Practice. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2010.
Delannoi, Gil. “Le tirage au sort.” Esprit, aout-septembre 2011, pp.153-162.
Dowlen, oliver. The Political Potential of Sortition. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008.
Dowlen, oliver. “Sorting out Sortition: A Perspective on the Random Selection of Political 
officers.” Political Studies 57 (2009): 298-315.
Dowlen, oliver. “Sortition and Liberal Democracy: Finding a Way Forward.” In Gil Delannoi 
and oliver Dowlen, eds. Sortition Theory and Practice. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2010.
Dowlen, oliver. “Sanitizing Justice.” Res Publica 18:4 (November 2012): 367-371.
Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New york: Harper & Row, 1957.
Dryzek, John S. Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science. New york: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Duxbury, Neil. Random Justice: On Lotteries and Legal Decision-Making. oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1999.
Elster, Jon. Solomonic Judgments. New york: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Elster, Jon. Political Psychology. New york: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Finlay, Robert. Politics in Renaissance Venice. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
Press, 1980.
Fishkin, James S. When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation. 
New york: oxford University Press, 2009.
BIBLIoGRAPHy
THE LOTTERY AS A DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION
44
Gibbard, Allan. “Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance.” Econometrica 
45, no. 3 (April 1977): 665-681.
Goodwin, Barbara. Justice by Lottery. 2nd ed. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2005.
Griffiths, A. Phillips and Wollheim, Richard. “How Can one Person Represent Another?” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol. 34 (1960): 187-224.
Habermas, Jürgen. “Three Normative Models of Democracy.” Constellations 1, no. 1 
(1994): 1-10.
Headlam J.W. Election by Lot at Athens. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933.
Manin, Bernard. The Principles of Representative Government. New york: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997.
McCormick, John P. “Contain the Wealthy and Patrol the Magistrates: Restoring Elite 
Accountability to Popular Government.” American Political Science Review 100:2 (May 
2006): 147-163.
Michels, Robert. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of 
Modern Democracy. Translated into English by Eden Paul and Cedar Paul. New york: The 
Free Press, 1915. From the 1911 German source.
Mueller, Dennis C.; Tollison, Robert D.; and Willett, Thomas D. “Representative Democracy 
via Random Selection” Public Choice 12 (Spring 1972): 57-68. Reprinted in Peter Stone, ed. 
Lotteries in Public Life: A Reader. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2011.
Mulgan, Richard G. “Lot as a Democratic Device of Selection.” Review of Politics 46 
(october 1984): 539-560. Reprinted in Peter Stone, ed. Lotteries in Public Life: A Reader. 
Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2011.
o’Leary, Kevin. Saving Democracy: A Plan for Real Representation in America. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2006.
Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970.
BIBLIoGRAPHy
THE LOTTERY AS A DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION
45
Peonidis, Filimon. “Bringing Direct Democracy in a Representative Assembly: the Case 
for Allotted MPs.” Paper presented at “Democracy as Idea and Practice,” oslo, Norway, 
January 2010.
Plamenatz, J.P. Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation. 2nd ed. New york: oxford 
University Press, 1968.
Przeworski, Adam; Stokes, Susan C.; and Manin, Bernard, eds. Democracy, Accountability, 
and Representation. New york: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Rae, Douglas. Equalities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: Routledge, 2010.
Shapiro, Ian. The State of Democratic Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2003.
Sher, George. “What Makes a Lottery Fair?” Noûs 14 (1980): 203-216. Reprinted in Peter 
Stone, ed. Lotteries in Public Life: A Reader. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2011.
Shklar, Judith. “The Liberalism of Fear.” In Political Thought and Political Thinkers. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
Sintomer, yves. Le Pouvoir au Peuple: Jury Citoyens, Tirage au Sort, et Démocratie 
participative. Paris: La Découverte, 2007.
Stone, Peter. “Why Lotteries Are Just.” Journal of Political Philosophy 15, no. 3 (2007): 
276-295.
Stone, Peter. “The Logic of Random Selection” Political Theory 37, no. 3 (June 2009): 375-397.
Stone, Peter. “Three Arguments for Lotteries.” Social Science Information 49, no. 2 (June 
2010a): 147-163.
Stone, Peter. Review of The Political Potential of Sortition by oliver Dowlen. Philosophical 
Quarterly 60, no. 240 (July 2010b): 664-666.
BIBLIoGRAPHy
THE LOTTERY AS A DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION
46
Stone, Peter. The Luck of the Draw: The Role of Lotteries in Decision Making. New york: 
oxford University Press, 2011.
Stone, Peter, ed. Lotteries in Public Life: A Reader. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2011.
Stone, Peter. “From Difference to Descriptive Representation.” Paper presented at the 
Glasscock Centre for Humanities Research, Texas A & M University, March 6, 2012a.
Stone, Peter. “Sortition and Voting: A Theoretical Framework.” Paper presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the Political Studies Association of Ireland, 2012b.
Stone, Peter. “A Renaissance for Random Selection?” Redescriptions, forthcoming.
Sutherland, Keith. The Party’s Over. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004.
Sutherland, Keith. “A People’s Parliament.” In Callenbach, Philips, and Sutherland 
(2008).
Vergne, Antoine. “A Brief Survey of the Literature of Sortition: Is the Age of Sortition 
upon Us?” In Gil Delannoi and oliver Dowlen, eds. Sortition: Theory and Practice. Exeter: 
Imprint Academic, 2010.
Waldron, Jeremy. “Political Political Theory: An Inaugural Lecture.” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 21:1 (2013): 1-23.
Walzer, Michael. “A Day in the Life of a Socialist Citizen.” In Obligations: Essays on 
Disobedience, War, and Citizenship. New york: Simon and Schuster, 1970.
Walzer, Michael. Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New york: Basic 
Books, 1983.
Zakaras, Alex. “Lot and Democratic Representation: A Modest Proposal.” Constellations 
17:3 (September 2010): 455-471.
ACKNoWLEDGEMENTS
THE LOTTERY AS A DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION
47
acknoWLeDGemenTs
The convenors of “The Lottery as a Democratic Institution: A Workshop” are deeply 
grateful to all of the participants—both those on the programme and those taking part 
in the discussions—for making the workshop such a success. They made many valuable 
comments and suggestions—too many, in fact, for all to be fully addressed in the space of 
our brief report. We have endeavoured to acknowledge these contributions and respond 
to them where possible. of course, we are fully responsible for the ideas expressed in this 
report.
The convenors would also like to thank Denise Carolin Huebner for providing staffing at 
the workshop; Helen Murray (Policy Institute) for her invaluable organizational skills; Tom 
Pegram (Director of the Policy Institute) for consistently supporting both the workshop and 
this report; and Peter Simons (Head of Trinity’s School of Social Sciences and Philosophy) 
for opening the workshop. The summary of the workshop contained in Appendix 2 was 
prepared by oliver Dowlen and Berenice Benjelloun from a Dictaphone recording of the 
conference proceedings. Jan-Willem Burgers reviewed the report and provided helpful 
comments and suggestions.
Funding for the workshop was provided by the Arts and Social Sciences Benefactions 
Fund, by the Policy Institute, and by Sciences Po.
Subsequent to the workshop, Peter Stone presented draft versions of this report at the 
Séminaire de Recherche, Département de Science Politique et Relations Internationals, 
University of Geneva, March 11, 2013; and at the Political Science Department Writing 
Workshop, Trinity College Dublin, April 2, 2013. He is grateful to participants at both 
events for their many helpful comments and suggestions, and to Annabelle Lever and Will 
Phelan in particular for making these events possible.
APPENDIX 1
THE LOTTERY AS A DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION
48
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aPPenDix 2: summary of ProceeDinGs for “The LoTTery as a
DemocraTic insTiTuTion: a WorkshoP”
note: This summary was prepared by oliver Dowlen and Berenice Benjelloun from a 
Dictaphone recording of the conference proceedings.
The workshop opened with a welcome by Peter Simons, Head of the School of Social Sciences 
and Philosophy at Trinity College Dublin, and with a presentation by Antoine Vergne 
entitled “From Gambling to Sortition: A Proposal for a Typology of Random Selection.”
In section 1 of the workshop, Peter Stone presented the first section of the draft report, 
addressing himself to the question, “What can random selection contribute to politics.” 
In order to address this point, he inquired how best to understand what random selection 
does and how can it be put to use.
In respect to the first question, there seems in the recent discussions to be a division 
that has emerged. on one side of the divide is the “monist” view that the lottery has 
one primary property and that when an application is considered the appropriateness 
of the lottery is judged by whether this property is required in any given situation. This 
interpretation has been ascribed to the work of oliver Dowlen in The Political Potential of 
Sortition (2008) and to Peter Stone’s The Luck of the Draw (2011). The pluralist view, on the 
other hand, is a view that accepts that a lottery by a multitude of properties, and therefore 
a multitude of possible applications.
There is a sense, however, that neither Stone nor Dowlen are ruling out diversity, but 
rather that they are seeking to draw clearer lines of division between claims in order to 
facilitate a more focussed discussion. Some claims for the lottery are very similar, and it is 
the job of analysis to clarify this. The view of the author of this section of the report (Peter 
Stone), for instance, is the centrality of the quality of unpredictability.
In respect of the second point of inquiry—how lottery can best be put to good use—the 
report puts forward the following eight possibilities:
1) To aid descriptive representation by creating a governmental or decision-making body 
that constitutes the population in miniature. Whether or not descriptive representation is 
a valuable idea is another important but complex question, but a position that commanded 
greater consensus was that where a diversity of voices was necessary, sortition could deliver.
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2) To prevent corruption or domination of the political process by powerful groupings.
3) To mitigate politically destructive competition amongst elites by creating shared 
procedural norms.
4) To control political outliers (so as to allow possible inclusion, but to prevent domination 
by extremist groupings).
5) To allocate the benefits and burdens of society fairly (distributive justice).
6) To increase participation in the political process.
7) To generate rotation in political participation. A lottery could contribute to this, but 
much depends on the central institutional design.
8) To provide various psychological benefits. Lotteries obviate the triumphalism of the 
winners and assuage the shame of the losers. By the same token, if entitlement on the basis 
of personal merit and its opposite (the exclusion and shame of the less-than-competent) 
were seen as wholly desirable, the use of lottery would be problematic.
Hubertus Buchstein provided the first response to Stone’s presentation. He questioned the 
creation of too strong a link between sortition and democracy. Lotteries were not inevitably 
connected to democracy and could actually fulfil anti-democratic roles. There was also 
a question of why a general theory of sortition was needed; a perspective which involved 
comparisons with other forms of political decision-making might be better. There was 
also a problem with the monist/pluralist classification. Better, he argued, to proceed on a 
more principled basis by looking at concepts such as procedural autonomy and seeing how 
a lottery, as a procedure immune to interference, confirms or promotes this.
on the subject of the number of possible benefits, Buchstein argued that what was needed 
was a strategy for understanding what should be included and which excluded. Lotteries 
can be used to stabilise pre-democratic political settlements through general political 
consolidation. This we can also see as part of transformative scenarios, as opposed to being 
related to some distinct form of polity. In respect to future research we should look more at 
empirical evidence. This could come from areas outside politics, such as secondary school 
applications or from computer simulations.
The second response to Stone’s presentation came from yann Allard-Tremblay. He 
identified the importance of a procedure in which the absence of reason allows us to 
look at reasons and not at interests, to avoid domination and control, and to counteract 
the interest of naked power. It is this that gives sortition its democratic legitimacy; it is 
acceptable because it is not part of the politics of interest and bias. A lottery is arational, but 
not unaffected by the operation of reason in its application and its background conditions. 
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There is ‘intentionality’ in the application of a lottery; it is not absolute unreason, but can 
have a rationality which connects it to democratic legitimacy.
on the subject of descriptive representation, Allard-Tremblay argued, we should look at 
the primary alternative, voting, and enquire about its legitimacy. Elections have many 
defects, but they certainly connect the government to the people. Since lotteries reduce 
the capacity of political power, sortition could be viewed as fair, while descriptive 
representation would improve the epistemic features of democracy through the generation 
of diversity (and it would do so in a fair way). We would also have to realise that there could 
be problems of accountability and inexperience in a political set-up that had descriptive 
representation as its rationale and featured lottery selection with strict rotation. Schemes 
based on descriptive representation could be combined with rational means, such as the 
voluntary expression of views to make up for imperfections in the descriptive representation 
paradigm. Allard-Tremblay noted here Josiah ober’s examination of how random selection 
in Athens facilitated the redistribution of practical and social knowledge. Descriptive 
representation might be important for some institutions, but the case for using sortition as 
an anti-domination measure is stronger.
Allard-Tremblay argued that there were several points missing from the draft report:
1) Participation has the effect of boosting deliberation, contributing to the creation of a 
people—a network of interrelated interests where information can be pooled and social 
barriers broken down.
2) The use of lotteries to make decisions should not be dismissed. Forms of lottery voting 
could be valuable in a number of contexts. We need to be clear why we find it more 
acceptable to choose officials by lot than to make decisions by the same method.
3) It was not always clear how effective sortition actually is at preventing corruption. How 
does it compare with majority voting, for instance?
Descriptive representation, Allard-Tremblay concluded, is not the main reason for the 
development of lotteries, but it can contribute to the primary capacity of sortition to 
promote shared social knowledge and robust, legitimate, democratic policies.
The workshop then entered into wide-ranging discussion focused upon section 1 of the 
draft report. A number of topics received extensive attention in this discussion. These 
included the relationship of sortition to democracy; the monist/pluralist aspect of the 
presentation and its relation to descriptive representation; the need for empirical evidence; 
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the comparison between deliberative forms and direct democracy; decision-making by lot 
in general; and the capacity for lotteries to disrupt the activities of interest groups.
Some agreed it was wrong to associate sortition solely with democracy, but the point 
was made that the appropriateness of sortition as a democratic institution depended on 
what definition or theory of democracy was alluded to. The answer would be different for 
different conceptions of democracy. The idea of government operating in the interests of 
the people or that democracy included the need for political expression could be seen as 
commensurate with sortition. But democracy as government by the wise on behalf of the 
unwise would not be.
There was also discussion of the relationship between the Athenian polis and the modern 
political context. The principle of the circulation between the ruler and ruled could be 
seen as a central justification for sortition, although Aristotle did not expressly make that 
connection. The notion that this type of circulation would be possible in a large modern 
polity was challenged. There was however, no clearly expressed ancient rationale for the 
use of sortition. Reconstruction was needed to achieve this.
The idea of a totally pluralistic, relativist opposition to the use of sortition was attacked 
on the basis that this created semantic chaos. Citizens would need clear reasons why 
sortition could be valuable. Advocates of a more pluralistic approach were worried about 
the centrality of the arational and arationality in theories justifying the use of sortition. 
one way of expressing this was to distinguish positive uses of sortition from negative 
or preventative uses. Descriptive representation was a positive use; the inhibition of 
corruption or the limiting of power was a negative use. Putting unpredictability at the 
centre of lottery theory should be challenged by the value of the lottery in descriptive 
representation; in this case its use becomes predictable, based on ratio and operating at the 
group rather than the individual level. Against this view, it was suggested that this form 
of predictability merely served the politics of interest; moreover, it could be argued that 
the preventive action of sortition was itself part of the promotion of positive, principled, 
inclusive politics.
It was also suggested that there was a tacit coalition forming between advocates of 
deliberative democracy and those of descriptive representation. Sortition was being 
incorporated to bolster a pure theory of deliberative democracy.
There was general agreement on the need for more empirical research, especially on 
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people’s attitude to existing or recent lottery schemes. What do British MPs think, for 
instance, of the use of lotteries to select private members bills for debate? Do we have 
evidence of attitudes to the United States’ Vietnam-era draft lottery? Do we know if there 
were citizens juries with mandatory rather than advisory powers? We should look to some 
of the non-political uses of sortition, such as lotteries for higher education places, to serve 
as strong examples. This could help us to evaluate the emotional reactions to sortition. It 
was also noted that the prospect of sortition for office could stimulate positive attitudes 
to participation.
Direct democracy, often based of the Swiss example, featured strongly in the discussion. It 
was cited as a better alternative to the use of deliberative groups and was a direct expression 
of citizens’ views compared to the indirectness implied in descriptive representation. It 
was also noted that many of the eight points could be addressed by non-random means. 
There was some discussion on the question of decision-making by lot; whether it was 
possible to define a corrupt decision; whether we should follow Condorcet and see the 
majority as necessarily morally right; and whether we were “epistocrats” and placed all 
our political eggs in the basket of “rightness.”
While not a major theme in the discussion, the importance of sortition in breaking the link 
between government and economic class was stressed, as was its value for breaking up the 
political habits of debate by placing members of a deliberating group in new relationships 
with each other.
After a break for lunch, oliver Dowlen opened Session 2 of the workshop by inquiring how 
random selection might best be incorporated into democracy. The idea of the draft report, 
Dowlen said, was to establish where the current arguments have led us, and also to outline 
the sort of lottery theory that has underpinned the discussions up to now. The second 
section of the report offered an attempt to integrate this with ideas of institutional design.
The best starting point for both lottery theory development and the prospective application 
of lotteries to politics is with the qualities of the lottery process itself. once these qualities 
are grasped, we can then adopt a design approach to match the qualities of the lottery 
with the task that we wish the lottery to undertake. This helps us to assess whether the 
lottery is the right tool for the job. one way of looking at this is to think of the lottery as 
a mechanism that deliberately excludes the human. If we wish to use a lottery we do so 
because we wish to use one or more of the non-human attributes of the procedure.
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on the question of how random selection methods might best be incorporated into 
democracy, it might be better to consider the complementary question, “Why?” With 
respect for participation, the desire for participation comes historically from the perceived 
deficiencies of liberal democracy. If we now consider the use of sortition to engender 
participation as a desired good we have to ask what more is added to this good by the use 
of this particular mechanism.
The first point about incorporation is the idea that sortition should be used in combination 
with existing democratic institutions rather than in opposition to them, or to their 
exclusion. The second chamber scenario, where each chamber has a different function, 
might be ideal. Citizen monitoring of, and assistance for, elected officers would fit this 
complementary pattern, as would “citizen witness” schemes. This role of monitoring and 
protecting the political system fits with the use of sortition as an impartial mechanism 
and has an existing pedigree of operating in this capacity.
other important points discussed by Dowlen included the question of whether lotteries 
should be voluntary or compulsory; what sort of training should be given to office-holders; 
and what sort of remuneration could be given to citizen office-holders.
one of the main difficulties in assessing how these schemes might operate is the tendency 
to view potential sortive measures through the prism of the current position of the non-
participatory citizen in a largely disconnected, self-interested society. Along with the 
measures themselves, the context for application would need to be developed. Finally, it 
might be useful to separate analysis of the particular problem-solving facility of sortition 
from explanation of how more systematic use of the mechanism might change or challenge 
our ideas of democracy.
Stephen Elstub offered the first response to Dowlen. He began by acknowledging that this 
was a new area of investigation for him, although he had had experience of deliberative 
democracy and mini-publics. on the question of descriptive representation, overreliance 
on descriptive representation could be problematic, but it could be relevant for certain sorts 
of system and could be a principle that could extend the range of ideas in any deliberation. 
People could also have great trust in “people like us.” on the prevention of corruption, he 
stressed, it is important to remember that manipulation could still occur with sortition. 
on the subject of impartiality, he argued that the expression of partiality and the voices 
of stake-holders are necessary parts of the political process. The complementary role of 
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sortition within mixed institutions seems to offer the most likely way forward. Institutions 
could be designed to deliver the democratic values that were wanted.
Elstub concluded with a few reflections on the problem of institutional design. Further 
research regarding institutions could best be achieved in a full comparative framework, 
using both empirical evidence and nominative analysis. Rotation has to be seen as an 
independent mechanism in its own right. We have to ask why participation might be 
considered a desirable good, recognising that the ideal government should reflect all the 
interests in society. Voluntary schemes are preferable to compulsory, and this principle 
should govern institutional design. Finally, we would need to look carefully at questions 
of incentive and accountability.
The second response to Dowlen came from Ètienne Chouard. His response dealt mainly 
with the potential of sortition for rectifying social injustice. The main cause of social 
injustice is the powerlessness of ordinary good people. The interests of the poor are 
systematically excluded from most modern constitutional arrangements, although the 
institution of constitution itself has the capacity to weaken concentrations of power. 
Similarly, representation, while currently misused, has the capacity to prevent the 
domination by the strongest. Within this framework there are a variety of potential uses 
for sortition: a second chamber to offer a counterweight to an elected legislative body; the 
control of judges; the control of the executive; the control of the media; the control of the 
legislature so as to limit the influence of lobbyists. All of these would fit under the general 
aim of improving representative government.
It is difficult to see how any arrangement of this sort could come about through elected 
governments. It is important to convince ordinary people of the value of this sort of 
arrangement, and also to see the benefits of having amateur rather than professional 
representatives.
We can get a further perspective on these matters by comparing the 200 years of Athenian 
government by the poor with our 200 years of government by the rich. We should not 
think of sortition as the only way of achieving social justice, but it is certainly one way of 
improving representation and breaking the identification of government with the richest 
social class. 
Discussion of section 2 of the draft report then ensued. In this discussion the following 
themes were pursued: 1) the disentangling of sortition from the concept of deliberative 
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democracy and its different elements; 2) the type of transformative process that would 
be needed to introduce and evaluate sortive measures; 3) the nature of democracy in 
its ancient and modern guises and its relation to sortition in both; 4) how sortition and 
deliberative democracy relate to direct democracy.
Some contributors felt that descriptive representation could usefully be de-coupled from 
deliberative democracy. others were keen to point out differences in the interpretation 
of deliberation—a Habermasian emphasis on speech versus an emphasis on “weighing” 
derived from Fishkin, for example. There was some confusion as to the exact meaning of 
“sortition.” The term seemed to some contributors to signify a future system as a whole, 
rather than simply the lottery mechanism. This impression was corrected, and it was also 
pointed out that in Athenian practice the main deliberative body, the Assembly, was not 
selected by sortition.
This raised the question of whether a deliberative assembly needed to be selected by 
lottery, and a subsequent suggestion that deliberative democracy and sortition should 
be viewed as independent and separate. Similarly it was felt that it would be useful to 
separate participation from deliberation, since the former encompassed a wider range of 
possible activities. 
on the question of descriptive representation it was stressed that this concept could not 
be realised individually but only collectively. Descriptive representation offered the 
possibility of cognitive enlargement and promoted cognitive diversity. Those selected need 
not act solely in their own interest for the system to operate successfully. It was also pointed 
out that descriptive representation would soon reduce to active representation as dentists 
(for example) asked their parliamentary members to take an active role on their behalf.
The question of evaluating sortition with respect to possible future use generated 
discussion about the relationship between theory and practice. There was a clear need 
to examine places where sortive schemes were operating successfully and there were 
strategic questions about the transformative path to greater use of the mechanism. Certain 
decentralised federal structures such as the United States and Germany could offer 
opportunities for experiment beyond the local level.
It was pointed out, however, that it would not be a simple matter to infer the success 
of a nationwide scheme from a successful local one. There were however, some aspects 
of modern democratic rule, such as the dangers of factionalism, that paralleled ancient 
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experience and this could be used as empirical evidence if care was taken to compare the 
historical context with modern conditions. The need to present sortition as part of a whole 
package of measures was stressed; assessing sortition outside the particular schemes in 
which it was to operate could also be problematic.
In response to the question of where there were any randomly selected schemes currently 
operating successfully, the example of the jury was cited. This was important because of 
its operational position within the constitutions where it was used, because of its potential 
law-making capacity (in common-law systems), and because of its role as the guardian of 
political freedom. Many modern citizens’ jury schemes were “crisis led.” The response 
rates of members of the public to such sortive and deliberative schemes were not always 
favourable, and many of those most likely to be affected by the proposals in hand were the 
most uninterested.
There was much discussion about the term “democracy” and how ancient practices 
differed from modern representative government. It was noted that there was nothing 
intrinsically democratic about sortition, but it did have the potential to break the links 
between social and economic power and political power.
It was thought by some that the name “democracy” was misleading since in the ancient 
democracy the poor could, to some extent, control the rich, whereas the opposite was 
true with modern representative democracy. The idea was even expressed that the term 
“representative democracy” was a contradiction. It had to be recognised that the inventors 
of modern representative democracy, particularly the Americans in the late 18th century, 
did not use the term, but saw themselves as founding a republican system. As a modern 
“desirable good,” the term was also shrouded in rhetoric. In earlier periods it was a 
pejorative term, denoting the poor gathering in a threatening manner. It was also pointed 
out that in Athens sortition and other methods developed in a pre or proto-democratic 
phase which helped to promote a role-governed, stable, participating polis. It was felt that 
representation itself was not flawed, but needed to be controlled. If the existing checks 
and balances were inadequate to control the experts, then tribune-type systems might be 
a valuable addition. In this respect the difference between parliamentary and republican 
constitutional arrangements needed to be recognised. The idea that liberal democracy was 
not sufficiently accountable was challenged, but it was also pointed out that the Athenian 
system incorporated a wide range of popular anti-corruption and accountability measures 
far beyond those of the modern liberal paradigm.
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There was a brief discussion of direct democracy at the close of this session. This discussion 
focused on whether direct democratic measures would be preferable to sampled min-publics. 
Session 3 of the workshop opened the next morning. Gil Delannoi offered some reflections 
on part 3 of the draft report and on the report in general. He noted that the current workshop 
was part of a series launched two years ago which included sessions on democracy and 
direct democracy and on the advent of representative government as the use of sortition was 
on the decline. Next year there were two sessions planned, one on sortition in transition 
to democracy, and another (to take place in Switzerland) on a theme to be announced. Any 
suggestions of subject matter for the future, Delannoi added, would be welcome.
Delannoi himself once advocated sortition for the selection of an important university 
chairperson. This proposal was rejected, but a proposal to elect without candidates was 
accepted. This story demonstrates how sortition, or at least the threat of sortition, could 
work in mysterious ways.
What we need to look at now, Delannoi concluded, is what institutional measures need to 
accompany sortition; how different measures of selection compare to each other; and what 
bundles of democratic values can be promoted by the use of sortition. There is always hope 
that funding will be found for experiments that we could then examine and observe or 
that local government officers somewhere might be persuaded to collaborate.
David Farrell and Jane Suiter responded to Delannoi’s remarks. Farrell reported on work 
that he and another colleague had undertaken in the previous year. In terms of the wider 
context, this work is linked to theoretical work concerned with the current health of 
representative democracy. This work led to arguments about how to define “democracy,” 
but it was judged easiest to go with Dahl’s notion of polyarchy. Central to this notion was 
the idea that citizens needed only to be active at election time. Even this minimal notion 
of democracy is affected today by declining turnout, dwindling support for parties, and a 
general sense that representative democracy is failing. Nonetheless, there is a widespread 
sense that there still exists space in representative democratic structures for more 
citizen involvement between elections. Farrell was particularly interested in temporary 
institutions of a deliberative type set up with a particular purpose in mind, especially the 
“We the Citizens” project in Ireland.
Suiter asserted that the key question concerning large-scale deliberative projects is that 
of participation. This meant talking about the recruiting methods employed for such 
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projects, as well as the differences in perception between those who were willing to take 
part and those who, for whatever reason, were indifferent to political questions. There 
is a discernible difference, Suiter argued, between dissatisfied democrats—those who 
had already had some political experience, but had become disenchanted with the status 
quo—and those who had never taken any interest in the political process. This latter group 
amounted to some 20% of the population. 
The “We the Citizens” project, with which both Farrell and Suiter were involved, involved 
sortition, but while the citizens were initially chosen randomly they took part only if they 
then agreed to do so. Recruitment was by random digital dialling. In some senses it was a 
mock citizens’ assembly. Its object was to explore possible reforms to the current system, 
based on the premise that a promise of reform had been made by the last government.
The group chosen for “We the Citizens” could be described as fairly representative, 
but it included some surprising elements, such as people in their 40’s who had never 
voted. Discussions in the project followed a small group format in an informal “café”-
type environment. of the 1200 positive telephone respondents, 100 actually took part. 
Information packs were sent out to all and regular phone calls were needed to maintain 
involvement. Much of the academic interest lay in when and how people changed their 
minds during the deliberative process, how shifts of understanding took place and the 
extent to which participants’ views remained fixed.
The project aroused interest from professional politicians and members of the government, 
and shortly afterwards the government announced its own convention. 66 randomly-
selected members of the public, plus 33 MPs, would meet to discuss the reduction of the 
voting age from 18 to 17, a proposal to reduce the term of the president from 7 to 5 years, 
and other topics.
Most of the discussion that followed in this session focused upon the “We the Citizens” 
project. There were also more general questions or inquiries about the value of the process 
as a whole and its relationship to other sortive or democratic procedures
In the first category there were questions about the aggregating of voices in the discussion 
and whether it could be determined when people changed their minds. Additional 
knowledge appeared as the instigator of greatest change, and because some non-attendees 
had been sent information packs it was theoretically possible to determine the effect of 
attending the deliberative sessions.
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People with left-wing views seemed more open to change than those with right-wing 
views. In answer to a question about whether recruitment was from the entire population 
(which would give the process legitimacy), it was explained that the random dialling 
system delivered a 99.5% coverage.
other questions concerned the long-term effects of these types of forums and whether 
people retained their newfound interest in politics. There was not much evidence either 
way on this, but politicians paid attention to the results of deliberation forums and this 
might help frame future agendas. Another direct question concerned who was representing 
who in a forum of this type. In other words, could we be justified in assuming that those 
who attended were somehow representing those who didn’t? The response to this was that 
the effect of these forums should not be overestimated; there was a sense that these forums 
were simply one way of trying to represent a fragmented and disorganized society and to 
give some sort of voice to those who did not have one.
The relationship between deliberative forums and referenda was also discussed. Was it 
right, for instance, that the final decision should be made on any issue by those who had 
not taken part in the forum? one response to this was to question the assumption that 
there was no deliberation amongst the public during a referendum. 
The difference, it was explained, between deliberative forums and referenda was that the 
former sought a more controlled, more informed, and more balanced discussion. Whatever 
the nominative value of each, it was useful to draw a distinction between these artificial 
agoras and their natural counterparts. Many articulated the view that people might prefer 
referendums to deliberative forums, but others thought some mini-publics could become 
leaders of public opinion. While deliberative forums had direct access to information, 
full public information provision was essential for referenda. It was pointed out that 
Switzerland was a very divided society yet somehow it managed to develop and maintain 
such a system. This was, in some respects, a response to an earlier question about how 
sortition could develop in a divided society like Northern Ireland (which was denied the 
right of trial by jury), and how deliberative democracy forums could work when there 
were so many pre-decided views.
There was some discussion about experts. In larger deliberative democracy forums, 
citizens themselves took greater responsibility for the choice of experts. It was also noted 
that in some constitutions, such as the United States, judges were assigned to their cases 
by sortition. This suggested other similar schemes involving experts could be developed.
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Questions were raised about the legitimacy of sortive forms and whether this representation 
by proxy, by “people like me,” could be seen as legitimate as the consent of the people in 
referendums. If “people like me” possessed the legitimacy to represent in the legislature, 
would others submit to their role if they formed part of the executive? This was a 
complicated issue, and part of a wider discourse on social contract theory. It was, however, 
pointed out that expressions of consent operated as political capital for political decision-
makers, and gave them the opportunity and encouragement to pursue certain issues. 
An example was deliberative forms in China which never really challenged authority.
There was a small amount of discussion as to whether sortition could help provide checks 
and balances in a polity. The subject of exclusions was explored, as well as and the need 
for transparency in random-selection procedures (especially in an age of computers). The 
G1000 forum in Belgium was briefly discussed and the systematic use of electronic media 
in that event was noted. Computer simulation might supply a different sort of empirical 
evidence for sortive schemes.
The relationship between sortition and power was suggested as a topic for further 
research. There was a similar interest expressed in comparative studies between sortive 
and elective schemes, as well as the use of random selection for social housing and/or 
immigration systems. The view was expressed that it might be useful to see sortition as 
part of a political narrative, especially amongst those nations who were new to democracy 
and were looking for new options. It was also pointed out that deliberative democracy had 
a strong profile in the academic community, whereas interest in other sorts of sortition 
was relatively low and should be encouraged.
The workshop closed with the conclusion of this session.
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